tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post205461080453573266..comments2023-12-15T03:43:21.347-05:00Comments on Somewhat Abnormal: RP: Fine Tuning Supports NaturalismRobert Oerterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comBlogger53125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-18705832815110581372015-01-11T19:34:27.083-05:002015-01-11T19:34:27.083-05:00This comment has been removed by the author.Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-75910161932471013922013-02-26T11:01:02.772-05:002013-02-26T11:01:02.772-05:00TS wrote,
"Your fundamental point about the ...TS wrote,<br /><br />"Your fundamental point about the prior probability being low on theism is completely backwards since the only thing that can legitimately be included in our background knowledge is what we know about the actual universe including the laws, constants, and boundary conditions we know about. We have know reason to think that omnipotence entails the ability to create a universe that operated according to different set of laws."<br /><br />There is teh problem with the FTA in a nutshell. Just turn your objection around to refer to naturalism rather than omnipotence: we have no reason to think that the laws of nature allow different values of the parameters than the ones we measure.<br /><br />But to respond to your objection, your position only works if the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then the hypothesis of a Designer is completely superfluous. There is nothing left to explain; the laws are the way they are because they couldn't be any other way. <br /><br />Your position makes any kind of fine tuning argument impossible.Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-79287839331344431652013-02-26T10:42:29.176-05:002013-02-26T10:42:29.176-05:00Weisberg's question is why the universe is suc...Weisberg's question is why the universe is such that only a narrow range of parameter values supports life, rather than a broad range. He doesn't address the issue of omnipotence and miraculous life at all. It's a completely different argument.Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-64274270984051597662013-02-26T10:38:02.318-05:002013-02-26T10:38:02.318-05:00OK, on that understanding of "coarse tuning&q...OK, on that understanding of "coarse tuning":<br /><br />There are many ways the universe could be coarse tuned, yet a miraculous intervention would allow life. The cosmological constant I mention below is one. God could be responsible for injecting the first reproducing cell in a universe where that couldn't happen naturally. God could create an Earth complete with animals in a universe where that couldn't happen naturally. Theists have insisted in the past that such things not only are possible, but have actually happened, so it's a bit hypocritical for you to turn around and claim that they're metaphysically impossible.<br /><br />2 immediately above presents a false dichotomy. The electromagnetic coupling, weak coupling, and strong coupling are independent constants in the Standard Model. But if the true laws of physics are grand unified theory, then these constants are not independent but related to each other. NECESSARILY related, if you are right. There is a huge number of examples where apparently arbitrary constants of nature have come to be understood as a consequence of deeper laws. Same thing for boundary conditions: if it turns out that the low entropy of the early universe is a consequence of some as-yet-unknown law of nature, then, according to you, it is a necessary condition, and therefore not fine tuned.Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-25185462276638374462013-02-25T18:40:41.657-05:002013-02-25T18:40:41.657-05:00Your fundamental point about the prior probability...Your fundamental point about the prior probability being low on theism is completely backwards since the only thing that can legitimately be included in our background knowledge is what we know about the actual universe including the laws, constants, and boundary conditions we know about. We have know reason to think that omnipotence entails the ability to create a universe that operated according to different set of laws. So then, there is nothing about our background knowledge that makes a fine-tuned universe improbable on theism. On the contrary, I gave several reasons to think that the prior probability of a fine-tuned universe is not low on theism, but is quite high. Moreover, on our specific evidence, theism is more probable than naturalism not because life exists (we can include that in our background knowledge), but because we discovered that life requires fine-tuning. In light of this we should ask ourselves the question: What is the best explanation of the discovery that life requires fine-tuning? So far, you haven't provided any naturalistic explanation for this fine-tuning you just think that the prior probability is low and that there is nothing to explain!<br /><br />We know that life-prohibiting universes are incredibly likely on naturalism, so why does a life-permitting universe exist? It is not surprising on theism that a life-permitting universe exists since 1-a desinger could select a life-permitting universe out of the sea of life-prohibiting universes, and 2-the discovery that life requries fine-tuning pumps a compelling intuition that a designer would pick out such a feature to design a universe with. As the narrowness of this life-permitting range increases the stronger the evidence for design gets. That is the fundamental intuition behind the design argument, and that is what fine-tuning has to do with it. <br /><br />I almost feel like this is too obvious to point out, but it seems to have been missed; if design is the best explanation of the dsicovery that life requires fine-tuning, then the fine-tuning of the universe is a miracle so that the assumption P(ML/T)>P(-ML/T)has been confirmed par excellence. And, after that, an efficient desginer wouldn't have to be tweaking things all the time, and as I say, per impossible your imagining some designer 'corralling' a galaxy would only point to design WITHIN the universe (much like ID proponents in biological design try to argue for) since it is not a cosmic 'miracle' rather than a designer OF the universe. So, it is more rational for a designer to give us the evidence we actually (recall the divine hiddenness argument) have than the kind you are imagining. Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-13867574653910000612013-02-25T17:34:57.796-05:002013-02-25T17:34:57.796-05:00You don't know that this is even metaphysicall...You don't know that this is even metaphysically possible, even for an omnipotent being and on the theorem of total probability your whole point about the prior probability of a coarse-tuned universe goes down the tubes. I also gave other reasons why an omnipotent being wouldn't do this if it could, and couldn't do it even if it was omnipotent. The point is, that on the known laws of nature these imagined scenarios of yours do not meaningfully factor into any valid form of inference.Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-62154315826705605942013-02-25T17:31:53.797-05:002013-02-25T17:31:53.797-05:00I don't know how you could say that. This pap...I don't know how you could say that. This paper gets to central intuition behind the fine-tuning argument using the Law of Likelihood and for anyone who reads it is should be apparent that 'your' objection is not original but already published by Andrea Weisberg. I am not going to summarize the exchange in the combox here.Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-55260991339031735222013-02-25T17:26:11.516-05:002013-02-25T17:26:11.516-05:00Hello,
1-The comments are directed at your argume...Hello,<br /><br />1-The comments are directed at your argument since (if I understand you) you are saying that since God is omnipotent, he could create life in a universe that doesn't require fine-tuning, which implies that since there is only one way we could be here on naturalism, namely, if the universe was fine-tuned (and we know that life exists), then the fact that we find ourselves in a fine-tuned universe rather than some non-fine-tuned universe (e.g. coarse-tuned) that is able to support life in any number of ways is surprising on theism since God is omnipotent, but not surprising on naturalism since this is the only way we could be here on naturalism. So, since we have no antecedent expectation on theism for life to require a fine-tuned universe, and the only way we could be here on naturalism is if the universe was fine-tuned, the fine-tuning actually provides support for naturalism over theism. By coarse tuning I mean just what you say that God could have created life in a universe that was not fine-tuned. <br /><br />2-It is not true that if the laws of nature are metaphyscicall necessary that the fine-tuning argument fails completely. What fine-tuning means is that the CONSTANTS and QUANTITIES that appear in the lasws of nature as well as certain BOUNDARY CONDITIONS (e.g. entropy) that the laws of nature operate on are fine-tuned. But, the surprising thing is that on the known laws of nature, there is a very very very tiny range that these constants and quantities as well as something like the amount of entropy must be 'set to' in order for the building blocks and environments that life requires to be produced. The laws of nature we know of are consistent with a wide range of strenghts and quantities for these constants and boundary conditions such that were they off by even a hairs breadth life would not be possible. <br />Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-15537883870696663022013-02-24T21:16:41.460-05:002013-02-24T21:16:41.460-05:00That's a very interesting paper. I think it...That's a very interesting paper. I think it's a much better formulation of the FTA than any other I've seen. It avoids my objection about jiggering with the background knowledge - L is explicitly included in Roberts's B. And it avoids the need to define a probability function over the parameter space. That's a huge improvement.<br /><br />But it doesn't avoid my objection here. In fact, it walks right into it. Roberts's crucial assumption is<br />Pr(R | D&B) > Pr(R | C&B)<br />But it is precisely Pr(R | D&B) that my argument shows to be very small. If, that is, we take D to be an omnipotent being. So we have no particular reason to think Roberts's crucial assumption is true.Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-38227600561853874512013-02-24T20:40:36.088-05:002013-02-24T20:40:36.088-05:00I've made the point elsewhere that the interve...I've made the point elsewhere that the interventions needed are not necessarily ongoing. For instance, in a universe that was expanding "too fast" for galaxies to form, God could corral enough matter miraculously to enable a galaxy to form. <br /><br />See<br />http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2012/12/so-i-pointed-out-my-ftan-fine-tuning.htmlRobert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-55223194717567799742013-02-24T20:35:22.366-05:002013-02-24T20:35:22.366-05:00This is an interesting paper, but doesn't addr...This is an interesting paper, but doesn't address my objection.Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-85640977674546316252013-02-24T20:34:27.176-05:002013-02-24T20:34:27.176-05:00Truth Seeker,
Thanks for the comments. I'm no...Truth Seeker,<br /><br />Thanks for the comments. I'm not sure who these comments are directed at: the OP does not mention anything about coarse tuning.<br /><br />With regard to your point #5, if the laws of nature are necessary, then the fine tuning argument fails completely. If there is only one way the laws of nature can be, there is no sense in talking about the probability of other laws.Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-23104746510951731542013-02-23T21:23:15.646-05:002013-02-23T21:23:15.646-05:00Yet another great article that shows the simple mi...Yet another great article that shows the simple mistake in your argument:<br /><br />http://philosophy.unc.edu/people/faculty/john-t.-roberts/infraredbullseye-philstud-final-wtp.pdfTruth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-36570479016264579432013-02-21T23:38:33.239-05:002013-02-21T23:38:33.239-05:00Another reasons to think that the probability of -...Another reasons to think that the probability of -ML/T is greater than the probability of ML/T is found here:<br />https://edisk.fandm.edu/michael.murray/Providence.pdf<br /><br />Basically, a tweaker God that had to constantly tweak creation with miraculous intervention is less perfect than a God that coudl endow creation with the natural resources to bring about the desired results. Kinda like a car that needs constant maintenance is not as well desgined as a car that never needs maintenance, or rarely needs maintenance.<br /><br />Also, the creation and fine-tuning argument are aimed at a creator and designer OF the universe whereas lesser miracles; miracles that are not cosmic in scope are aimed at a designer IN the universe. It is better for God to give us evidence at the cosmic scale rather than from WITHIN the universe if we had to choose one or the other.Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-69044635466980781472013-02-21T19:51:48.662-05:002013-02-21T19:51:48.662-05:00If I may ask a question for clarification:
What i...If I may ask a question for clarification:<br /><br />What is the difference between your argument and the Weak Anthropic Principle if any?Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-32066490054843606622013-02-21T19:42:57.498-05:002013-02-21T19:42:57.498-05:00Here is an even better reply by a professional phi...Here is an even better reply by a professional philosopher:<br />https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxkYXJyZW5icmFkbGV5cGhpbG9zb3BoeXxneDoxZmQ2MGViNmQ2NjU4YWUwTruth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-28596379999285212082013-02-21T19:32:56.008-05:002013-02-21T19:32:56.008-05:001-How do we know that omnipotence entails the abil...1-How do we know that omnipotence entails the ability to design life in a coarse-tuned universe? I sure don’t know this and I doubt that anyone can produce a legitimate reason to think it is true. Also, the fine-tuning argument isn’t related to omnipotence most directly but intelligence. So, even if the intelligent designer is not omnipotent, that really is neither here nor there when it comes to inferring design as the best explanation of the fine-tuning. You can’t impugn the fine-tuning argument for not showing that designer is omnipotent since isn’t the attribute under consideration in this argument.<br />2-Moreover, we know that an autonomous universe cannot be life-permitting on the known laws of nature unless it is fine-tuned. We know that this is metaphysically impossible and it is no part of omnipotence to be able to do the metaphysically impossible.<br />3-One cannot say that an omnipotent God could have created a life-permitting universe that was coarse-tuned ON A DIFFERENT SET OF LAWS since the theorem of total probability doesn’t say that we have to condition all RELEVANT evidence, only all AVAILABLE evidence, and it is completely unavailable to us what other universe operating under different laws of nature would be like.<br />4-Even if God could create a universe that permitted life in a coarsely-tuned universe that also operated under a different set of laws of nature than the known laws, I don’t think he would; at least if the atheist is correct and wants to avoid a double standard. Specifically, atheists often say that belief that God exists is logically prior to belief in God which leads us to suspect that God would give us sufficient evidence for his existence. The problem then becomes that if a life-permitting coarse-tuned universe would have plausible, nay more plausible natural explanations going for compared to a finely-tuned universe (such as chance). So, on the one hand atheists demand more evidence, and when the fine-tuning is presented as positive evidence, they then say that God is just as motivated to create a coarse-tuned universe as a fine-tuned universe so the fine-tuning can’t be evidence for God. This is the epitome of a double standard; they want God to give us evidence, and then the evidence given to them won’t be accepted unless God designed a universe that left no evidence of design!<br />5-A fair number of philosophers actually think that the know laws of nature are metaphysically necessary and hold in all possible worlds! If that is the case, then even an omnipotent God couldn’t have designed a universe that operated according to a different set of laws of nature, and in conjunction with (2) above, we can see that we can actually show that whatever our intuition about omnipotence is, we can longer be warranted by it. <br />Truth Seekerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01786844757672182664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-66094533000806876132013-02-08T17:34:15.469-05:002013-02-08T17:34:15.469-05:00"Also, I think throughout history theists hav..."Also, I think throughout history theists have pretty much uniformly supposed that ML is false."<br /><br />This just made my jaw drop. Surely, the traditional interpretation of Genesis for centuries was that God created the world through a series of miraculous interventions. Also, we have the Kalam cosmological argument that concludes that the beginning of the universe requires a miraculous intervention by God. And we have the arguments of classical theism that the very continuation of the universe requires the continuous and miraculous sustaining power of God.<br /><br />It seems to me that throughout history theists have pretty much uniformly supposed ML to be true, and only since the rise of modern science have tried to argue that God would want the world to run according to uniform rules. <br /><br />I'm wondering what you could possibly be thinking of when you wrote that?Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-26711335232976852682013-02-07T14:42:34.269-05:002013-02-07T14:42:34.269-05:00I'm not sure that's correct. A proponent o...I'm not sure that's correct. A proponent of the FTA (who need not be a theist, BTW) could argue as follows:<br /><br />If God does not exist, then there is (at least roughly) equal probability spread over the available parameter space. If God does exist, however, then there is not an equal probability spread, since it is antecedently probable on theism that God would create other moral agents.<br /><br />So what about Pr(~ML | T) and Pr(ML | T)? I still don't see a reason to think that Pr(ML |T ) > Pr(~ML | T). Also, I think throughout history theists have pretty much uniformly supposed that ML is false. That doesn't mean that they good reason, on T, to assume that ML is false. But from a historical perspective, denying ML is hardly an ad hoc maneuver designed just to avoid your argument.Secular Outposthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-68510983983553785442013-02-07T09:22:22.143-05:002013-02-07T09:22:22.143-05:00Jeffrey, thanks for the comment and the correction...Jeffrey, thanks for the comment and the correction. I'm glad that you think the argument is at least worth thinking about!<br /><br />As far as your criticism, I am applying the same assumptions as the theist applies in the FTA. Specifically, I am assuming (at least roughly) equal probability spread over the available parameter space. <br /><br />Of course, the theist can claim that Pr(~ML | T) > Pr(ML | T), as Alexander does in his response. But that's adding a new assumption, as I discussed <a href="http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2012/12/so-i-pointed-out-my-ftan-fine-tuning.html" rel="nofollow"> here</a>Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-6690737014184978522013-02-06T03:23:19.514-05:002013-02-06T03:23:19.514-05:00Hi Robert --
I've been thinking about your a...Hi Robert -- <br /><br />I've been thinking about your argument since you originally posted it. Something about it has been bothering me. I think I finally figured out what that is.<br /><br />First, I think you have a typo in the last formula in your post. You write:<br /><br />P(FTU|N&K&L) = Area(FTU)/Area(PU) << 1<br /><br />I think, however, you meant to write:<br /><br />P(FTU|T&K&L) = Area(FTU)/Area(PU) << 1<br /><br />Now for my idea. You write:<br /><br /><i>Remember that God is, by hypothesis, omnipotent. That means that God could have caused life to arise by miraculous means, even in a universe that was not fine-tuned.</i><br /><br />Let us define ML as the hypothesis that God miraculously allows life to arise in a universe that is not fine-tuned.<br /><br />Both ML and its denial (~ML) are logically compatible with theism. So I think the best way to evaluate the evidential significance of ML is to treat ML as an <i>auxiliary hypothesis</i> and apply the theorem of total probability.<br /><br />Pr(FTU | T & K & L) = Pr(ML | T) x Pr(FTU | ML & T & K & L) + Pr(~ML | T) x Pr(FTU | ~ML & T & K & L)<br /><br />What that formula shows is that, in order for the fine-tuning argument for naturalism to work, Pr(ML | T) must be greater than Pr(~ML | T). But it is far from obvious that that is the case. So what reason is there to suppose that Pr(ML | T) > Pr(~ML | T)?Secular Outposthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-85213509821092487452013-01-24T23:09:40.470-05:002013-01-24T23:09:40.470-05:00Not sure if you're aware, but the Third Millen...Not sure if you're aware, but the <a href="http://thirdmillennialtemplar.wordpress.com/2013/01/22/fine-tuning-argument-for-naturalism/" rel="nofollow">Third Millennial Templar</a> wrote a post about this post.Grundyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07339125862340793733noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-51069100619962317182013-01-07T10:37:38.695-05:002013-01-07T10:37:38.695-05:00Ben wrote,
"How is making assumptions or gues...Ben wrote,<br />"How is making assumptions or guesses about "what God would want to do" not an attempt to predict his behavior?"<br /><br />Is IS an attempt to predict his behavior. When I write FTA, I am referring to the usual Fine Tuning Argument FOR God. It is the Fine Tuning Argument FOR God that needs the extra assumption about what God would want to do. My argument (which I'm calling FTAN) does NOT make this assumption, or indeed any assumption about what God would or would not want to do. It only notes that it is POSSIBLE for an omnipotent God to create a universe that isn't fine-tuned for life, yet still has life.<br /><br />Sorry if I was unclear. Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-23643330172947223172013-01-07T09:42:20.816-05:002013-01-07T09:42:20.816-05:00>Ben wrote,
"You argument implicitly assum...>Ben wrote,<br />"You argument implicitly assumes ours is the only possible "natural" universe with life vs all the potential "miraculous" universes with life a God could have created"<br /><br />>No, it doesn't. Where did I say that?<br /><br />Uh Prof I did say "implicitly". I did not say "explicitly". That seems to be my interpretation of your argument or at least it's implication.<br /><br /><br />>>Ben wrote,<br />"your argument presuposes God's behavior can be predicted..."<br /><br />>No, no, no, you have it exactly backwards, Ben. It is the FTA that needs an assumption about what God would want to do (create a universe using few miracles),<br /><br />How is making assumptions or guesses about "what God would want to do" not an attempt to predict his behavior?<br /><br /><br />>as Pruss admits above. My argument makes FEWER assumptions about what God would want to do. I made this point already; see (1) above. Are you even reading my responses?<br /><br />Never the less it seems to want to try to predict God's behavior in some fashon via porbability. <br /><br /><br />>I agree that predicting God's behavior via probability is problematic (to say the least). But so is predicting the likelihood of life-admitting values of fundamental constants in the FTA. Any weakness you point out in my argument is also a weakness in the FTA, because THEY ARE THE SAME ARGUMENT.<br /><br />Yes it is possible the life-admitting values are woven into the fabric of reality so that no Universe without these values would possibly exist & that would take away any probability argument but the philosophical implications in favor of God would remain.<br /><br />It might make it stronger.<br /><br /><br />>Since you keep equating naturalism and positivism, it is clear that you are the one who needs to learn some more philosophy. I'm getting tired of repeating myself on this point, so I'm not going to say this again.<br /><br />Prof do you or do you not try to answer these questions using Science? Didn't you try to answer the First Way with some warmed over attempt to revive the Newton motion argument?<br /><br />I don't equate naturalism and positivism. I equate using science to directly detect God or god-phenomena with Positivism in the realm of things that should be answered by philosophy.<br /><br />>See the first chapter of Ladyman and Ross for a large number of variations of naturalism that are not positivistic.<br /><br />I'll check it out but it seems to me that is not your problem.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7164603649660539619.post-26505747010041175362013-01-05T14:48:24.050-05:002013-01-05T14:48:24.050-05:00Rats, I meant to post my comment on the other thre...Rats, I meant to post my comment on the other thread. Sorry for the jumping back and forth.<br /><br />Ben wrote,<br />"You argument implicitly assumes ours is the only possible "natural" universe with life vs all the potential "miraculous" universes with life a God could have created"<br /><br />No, it doesn't. Where did I say that?<br /><br />Ben wrote,<br />"your argument presuposes God's behavior can be predicted..."<br /><br />No, no, no, you have it exactly backwards, Ben. It is the FTA that needs an assumption about what God would want to do (create a universe using few miracles), as Pruss admits above. My argument makes FEWER assumptions about what God would want to do. I made this point already; see (1) above. Are you even reading my responses?<br /><br />Ben wrote,<br />"I reject the idea God's behavior can be predicted via probibility as incoherent."<br /><br />I agree that predicting God's behavior via probability is problematic (to say the least). But so is predicting the likelihood of life-admitting values of fundamental constants in the FTA. Any weakness you point out in my argument is also a weakness in the FTA, because THEY ARE THE SAME ARGUMENT. <br /><br />Ben wrote,<br />"So far you appoch God and Naturalism using a practical positivism(science alone). You need to learn more philosophy."<br /><br />Since you keep equating naturalism and positivism, it is clear that you are the one who needs to learn some more philosophy. I'm getting tired of repeating myself on this point, so I'm not going to say this again. <br /><br />See the first chapter of Ladyman and Ross for a large number of variations of naturalism that are not positivistic. Robert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.com