Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Thursday, March 17, 2011
Atheists Need Better Nicknames
Thanks to the incomparable Rebecca Watson, I recently learned of a new argument for the existence of God due to Christian YouTube personality Venom Fang X. And I immediately thought, "Wow. I wish I'd thought of the the name Venom Fang X."
I mean, just look at the pathetic atheist nicknames out there:
Come on, folks! We can't compete with Venom Fang X with nicknames like these! Let's get those atheist brains in gear and come up with some good names! (But "Skepchick" is pretty cool, you've got to admit.)
I mean, just look at the pathetic atheist nicknames out there:
Come on, folks! We can't compete with Venom Fang X with nicknames like these! Let's get those atheist brains in gear and come up with some good names! (But "Skepchick" is pretty cool, you've got to admit.)
Monday, March 14, 2011
Satan Is Born
I haven't had much time for blogging recently, so let me point you to this essay. The basic idea: early Judaism didn't have any concept of heaven or hell or Satan (as we understand him). All these concepts crept in through the influence of pagan religions, prominently Persian Zoroastrianism. Take a look, it's pretty cool stuff.
Friday, March 4, 2011
Swinburne Is Wrong Even When He's Right
Over at the Secular Outpost, Bradley Bowen is taking a whack at Swinburne, too. In the third part of his series, he mentions Swinburne's claim that there are no sound deductive proofs of God's existence. He quotes Swinburne's argument from his earlier book, The Coherence of Theism, in support of this claim.
You should read the argument yourself at the linked page, but as I understand it, it goes as follows:
Let's try out the same argument on a different topic. Let us suppose that the basic theorems of arithmetic are logically necessary. Now, take any statement that follows from the basic theorems: Fermat's Last Theorem, for instance. The negation of that statement is, of course, false. Here is the negation:
So, why does Swinburne think that the negation of a necessarily true statement should be obviously incoherent? It beats me.
Intuitively, it seems unlikely that any such a sweeping argument against deductive proofs of God's existence will be successful, any more than deductive disproofs of God's existence.
You should read the argument yourself at the linked page, but as I understand it, it goes as follows:
- If the existence of God were a logically necessary truth, then any statement that follows logically from God's existence would also be a logically necessary truth.
- Thus the negation of any such statement would be logically incoherent.
- When we look at these negated statements, they are not obviously incoherent.
- Therefore, the existence of God must not be a logically necessary truth.
Let's try out the same argument on a different topic. Let us suppose that the basic theorems of arithmetic are logically necessary. Now, take any statement that follows from the basic theorems: Fermat's Last Theorem, for instance. The negation of that statement is, of course, false. Here is the negation:
The equation an + bn = cn has a solution for some integers a, b, and c, and some integer n greater than 2.Now, that statement is certainly not obviously incoherent. Indeed, no one knew whether it was true or false for over 250 years. By Swinburne's argument, then, the basic truths of mathematics must not be logically necessary.
So, why does Swinburne think that the negation of a necessarily true statement should be obviously incoherent? It beats me.
Intuitively, it seems unlikely that any such a sweeping argument against deductive proofs of God's existence will be successful, any more than deductive disproofs of God's existence.
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