I'm having a good discussion about my anti-fine-tuning argument with Tyler Journeaux over at his blog, Third Millenial Templar. Which is a great name for a blog, by the way. (Reminds me of the need for better atheist nicknames.) Thanks to Grundy for pointing me to Tyler's blog.
Though a Christian, Tyler is unimpressed with Swinburne's argument for God. (Of course I agree with him here.) Tyler thinks that there are good deductive arguments for God - specifically, the cosmological argument from contingency. Now, it seems to me that even the theistic philosophers of religion have abandoned the hope for a convincing deductive argument for God (e.g. Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga - Ed Feser and William Lane Craig are the only exceptions I know of). So Swinburne's approach - a cumulative argument for God - would seem to be the only approach that has any hope of being convincing.
Thanks for the link to Journeaux's blog; looks very interesting. My thanks to Grundy as well.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the link to my blog, and thank you for kind words - particularly about my blog's name; almost everyone seems to think the name of my blog is not a good name, but I've always liked it (by the way, there are two n's in Millennial). If you don't mind my asking, have you read Pruss' Leibnizian cosmological argument? If not, I highly recommend it, as I think it is a good example of the kind of deductive cosmological argument from contingency I have in mind. Here's a link: https://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/papers/LCA.html
ReplyDeleteAlso, just as a sociological note, I think you should look up the work of Helen de Cruz to see just how many Theists think that we can offer probative arguments for the existence of God, and how many of them look to cosmological arguments of this kind. Even if I were in the intellectual minority, I'd be comfortable there, but I think, in point of fact, I'm not so alone as you seem to suggest.
You and that Leibnizian cosmological argument need to get a room. :-)
DeleteIf you haven't read this (and you probably have) I encourage you to see Grundy's post Grundy Disagrees #3, as well as the dialogue between Tyler and Grundy in the comment chain that follows. I also benefitted from the dialogue between you and Tyler at the link you provided. Now everyone needs to play a lot more poker and read a bunch of thermodynamics to add into this mix. Bravo.
ReplyDeleteI'd like to cite Addy Pross' book, What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology on Amazon.com here, which I previously cited on Grundy's post, Gaps All the Way Down, here and plan to cite on Ed Feser's post, Craig versus Rosenberg, here, and on Tyler's post, The Fallacy of "The Fallacy of Composition" Objection, here. Pross supports my request that we add in poker and a nice big pinch of thermodynamics to some of the discussions of science and the existence of God. [It took awhile but I finally found where I got the Pross link from - it was Jerry Coyne's post, Paul Davies, chemistry, and the origin of life, here].
ReplyDeleteThanks for the links, guys, I'll check them out.
ReplyDeleteTyler: I found de Cruz's page, but at a quick look it wasn't obvious which paper(s) address the question. Do you have a link? Maybe I'm being misled by Plantinga and Swinburne.
Sure. First, one can find her results concerning how many philosophers of religion find the arguments for Theism compelling and convincing here: http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2012/02/one-of-the-stri.html
DeleteThen, you might want to take a closer look at the raw data obtained by her survey(s) at the following link: http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2012/02/results-of-the-.html
Notice also here: http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2012/04/the-influence-o.html
In the 'detailed results' section, when one looks at how much more likely Theists are to rate the cosmological argument more highly than, say, atheists, the number shoots up from being 12.15 times (for the Design argument) or 7.76 times (for the ontological argument) to 23.12 times! I think that is rather significant when one contrasts it with all the other results (taking into account the way in which the survey is taken, etc.).
In sum, it seems that there are a significant number of philosophers of religion who are now Theists (more than 70%) and that the most highly favored argument for Theism across the board remains the cosmological argument.
Thanks, Tyler, but that doesn't really address my issue. The cosmological argument can be put forward as a deductive argument (Craig) OR as a probabilistic argument (Swinburne). So saying whatever percent of theists think it is a strong argument doesn't tell us whether they see it as a valid DEDUCTIVE argument, or only as an argument that raises (or should raise) the probability estimate of God's existence. No?
ReplyDeleteBTW, I'm working on a post on the cosmological argument, and I wasn't immediately able to find the posts on your blog where you address it. So if you don't mind....
Thanks in advance!
Sorry, that should have been "sound deductive argument", of course.
ReplyDeleteThere is a significant (IMO) debate going on, about the recent Craig v Rosenberg debate taped from Purdue on Feser's post here, if that helps any. It is the first time I have posted any comments there, attempting to focus at least some attention to the particular end of the argument where Aquinas adds the phrase "... and this everyone understands to be God." Craig uses this phrase at about 15:25 min into the broadcast (link is in main text of Feser post).
ReplyDeleteI raise the question whether the First Way relies on an inductive argument or an axiomatic premise (as part of its deductive argument), in particular where Feser in his book Aquinas says, quoting Aquinas [p.71]: "By contrast [to causal series ordered per accidens], 'in efficient causes.it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se -- thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect .... ' (ST I.46.2)."
I am specifically trying to understand whether that premise is derived, or whether it is axiomatic. My present understanding is that it may be an axiomatic given, and is therefore not derived (deductively or inductively). It leads, however, to the conclusion that there must be a first member to causal series ordered per se ... and then, without clear explanation to the definitional substitution of "God" for the term Prime Mover, which Aquinas proceeds through the next 49 chapters of ST to explicate.
Hope this helps. I am very interested in your future discussions and any blog posts. Peace.
Btw, in one of my comments under Feser's post, I asked why Aquinas (and even more so Aristotle) could not have used some expression like Initial Uncaused Immaterial Natural Unifying Force in place of Uncaused Cause or Prime Mover (recognizing of course that Aquinas would not have been familiar with the concern of modern physicists who are attempting to unify the various principal natural forces). I did get one response that he probably could have, but that that still would be what we mean by God. I take that as a serious response, but I do feel that somewhere in this metaphysical transition from Cause (or Mover or IUINUF) to God is where the most significant part of the modern debate between science and faith lies. Just thinking out loud here.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what the 'protocol' is for referring to comments elsewhere, but I set my main Qs on Feser's post at 2-4-13; 11:45pm: "My Q is, (1) why is it "unintelligible" that a series per se "might regress infinitely"? [p.72] and (2) if it is unintelligible, then why is God the answer, rather than an eternally existing natural force?"
ReplyDeleteI clarify a bit at 2-5-13; 1:12am & 1:23am. Then discuss Craig at 2-5-13; 4:57pm, and say this: "... isn't Feser [explaining Aquinas] grounding his /Aquinas' argument on an axiomatic premise that the human mind [indeed any mind] cannot reasonably conceive [or maintain or hold] that a causal series ordered per se can infinitely regress? ... to which someone such as Rosenberg might reasonably respond that he indeed can so conceive?"
Responding to a comment at 2-5-13; 8:39pm, I say: "My purpose was to query how a Thomist would respond to anyone (philosopher or scientist) who argued, as a metaphysical position, that a causal series ordered per se indeed had a first uncaused member ... and that first member, or first principle, was what everybody knew as the Initial Uncaused Immaterial Natural Unified Force of the whole world."
dover_beach replies at 9:44 pm & Mr. Green replies at 10:11pm & 10:19pm; I conclude at 10:36pm & 11:01pm. I won't quote d_b & Green since they aren't here. I was asked how my [IUINUF] position was different from the God of the philosophers position, to which I replied: "That is exactly my question to the Thomists." I wasn't trying to be cute, but went on to clarify: "Why did Thomas Aquinas use the word 'God' here rather than a more general expression, say one similar to my expression, Initial Uncaused Immaterial Natural Unified Force?"
My point is two-sided: why would it be unreasonable to hold that a Central Natural Force (CNF) might not eternally exist absent an intelligent eternal being (God)? But on the other hand, why can't theists make strong reasonable arguments that such a thing is in reality actually God (vis a vis Aquinas' next 49 chapters, or otherwise)? Peace.
Strike the word "not" in the phrase ".... (CNF) might not ..."
ReplyDeleteSorry, and if I violated any cross-blog protocols, let me know.