Theists and Atheists Agree...

Alexander Pruss of Prosblogion seems to have found an argument that theistic and atheistic philosophers agree on. From the comments:

So it looks like there are a number of people who have published on this, and all the papers that I've so far looked at basically agree that the following are not all true:
1. Evolution occurred pretty much as science describes it.
2. Naturalism is true.
3. Moral realism is true.
4. We have moral knowledge.

I don't understand all the arguments that lead up to this conclusion well enough to know whether to agree with it or not, but it's rather a fascinating conclusion if true.

Alexander, being a theist and a moral realist, naturally takes (3) and (4) to be true, and so concludes that either (1) or (2) is false - he then opts for naturalism being false.

I don't know enough about the whole realism/anti-realism debate to have a firm position, but I'm leaning anti-realist at the moment, so the argument doesn't present a real problem for me. But it seems to be a real problem for someone like Sam Harris, who is a naturalist and a moral realist. I don't think he would want to deny (4), either. From what I understand, he thinks that science can discover moral truths. So I wonder how Sam would respond to this argument.

But then, Sam thinks that discussions of metaethics and deontology only add to the amount of boredom in the world, so probably he wouldn't bother.

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God and the Big Bang

I used to wonder why Christians didn't make a big deal of the Big Bang. After all, it was at least one case of a "prediction" of Christianity that had been confirmed by science. Or so I thought at the time.

I found that, on the contrary, many Christians disbelieved the whole Big Bang idea and adamantly opposed it. Strange.

More recently, I have come to realize that the Big Bang is not actually a theory of how the universe began; rather, it is a theory of how the universe has changed over time. It is astounding that we can now describe the history of the universe back to 13.7 billion years ago, when it looked dramatically different than it does today. But if you try to push back further, then we have every reason to believe that our theories break down, and no reason to trust their predictions beyond a certain point.

The idea that the universe began in a singularity, which was also the beginning of time itself, is really no part of the Big Bang model (though it continues to appear in popular presentations of the theory).

This point is made in a well-thought-out paper by Hans Halvorson and Helge Kragh. (Hat tip: ex-apologist) They make a lot of other good points, too, and the whole thing is worth a read, but I was particularly struck by one thing. They ask what would happen to the theist's argument for God from the Big Bang if the theory were disproven. Would the failure of the Big Bang undermine theism? Of course not! Even if we knew the universe existed prior to the (moment we refer to as the) Big Bang, the theist could claim that God had created the universe at an earlier time, or that God had created an eternally existing universe. Then they say:

The point is that insofar as the failure of the big-bang model would not undermine theism, so the success of the big-bang model does not support theism.

This, I think, is a very important point. And it is one that is devastating for many of the conventional arguments for God.

The basic principle is this: if X is evidence for God, then ~X ("not X", the negation of X) must be evidence against God. Or to put it another way, if X and ~X are equally consistent with the God hypothesis, then neither of them can provide an argument for God.

Swinburne, for example, claims that the constancy of physics across time and space is evidence for God. Why does an electron here on earth have the exact same mass, charge, and spin as an electron in a distant galaxy? This constancy calls out for an explanation (says Swinburne) - and the explanation is God.

But suppose that one of the many experiments looking for changes in the fundamental constants was successful. Suppose, for instance, that we found the electron's charge was changing over time. Would Swinburne take this as evidence against God? I suspect he would not. But if the God hypothesis is equally consistent with constant electric charge or changing electric charge, then constant charge cannot be evidence for God.

On a larger scale, theists often ask what is the origin of natural laws themselves. But if regularity in the operation of nature is evidence for God, then lack of regularity - randomness - in its operation must be evidence against God. And quantum mechanics shows that, at the most basic level, nature is random and unpredictable. So quantum mechanics is evidence against God!

I don't really think that quantum mechanics is a good argument against God. By the same token, I don't think the regularity of physical laws, or the constancy of particular physical parameters, or the Big Bang singularity (if there was one),  are evidence for God. 

The Brontological Argument

PhilosophyBro's take on Anselm. (Warning, bad words ahead.)

Atheists Need Better Nicknames

Thanks to the incomparable Rebecca Watson, I recently learned of a new argument for the existence of God due to Christian YouTube personality Venom Fang X. And I immediately thought, "Wow. I wish I'd thought of the the name Venom Fang X."

I mean, just look at the pathetic atheist nicknames out there:

• Paul Z. "P.Z." Myers
• Hemant "Friendly Atheist" Mehta
• Jen "Blag Hag" McCreight
• Luke "Lukeprog" Muehlhauser
• John W. "John W." Loftus

Come on, folks! We can't compete with Venom Fang X with nicknames like these! Let's get those atheist brains in gear and come up with some good names! (But "Skepchick" is pretty cool, you've got to admit.)

Satan Is Born

I haven't had much time for blogging recently, so let me point you to this essay. The basic idea: early Judaism didn't have any concept of heaven or hell or Satan (as we understand him). All these concepts crept in through the influence of pagan religions, prominently Persian Zoroastrianism. Take a look, it's pretty cool stuff.

Swinburne Is Wrong Even When He's Right

Over at the Secular Outpost, Bradley Bowen is taking a whack at Swinburne, too. In the third part of his series, he mentions Swinburne's claim that there are no sound deductive proofs of God's existence. He quotes Swinburne's argument from his earlier book, The Coherence of Theism, in support of this claim.

You should read the argument yourself at the linked page, but as I understand it, it goes as follows:

1. If the existence of God were a logically necessary truth, then any statement that follows logically from God's existence would also be a logically necessary truth.
2. Thus the negation of any such statement would be  logically incoherent.
3. When we look at these negated statements, they are not obviously incoherent.
4. Therefore, the existence of God must not be a logically necessary truth. 

It would certainly be convenient for us atheists if there was a nice knock-down argument against deductive proofs of God. So I would like to be able to go along with Swinburne here. Unfortunately, the argument seems to fail.

Let's try out the same argument on a different topic. Let us suppose that the basic theorems of arithmetic are logically necessary. Now, take any statement that follows from the basic theorems: Fermat's Last Theorem, for instance. The negation of that statement is, of course, false. Here is the negation:

The equation  aⁿ + bⁿ = cⁿ has a solution for some integers a, b, and c, and some integer n greater than 2.

Now, that statement is certainly not obviously incoherent. Indeed, no one knew whether it was true or false for over 250 years. By Swinburne's argument, then, the basic truths of mathematics must not be logically necessary.

So, why does Swinburne think that the negation of a necessarily true statement should be obviously incoherent? It beats me.

Intuitively, it seems unlikely that any such a sweeping argument against deductive proofs of God's existence will be successful, any more than deductive disproofs of God's existence.