Tuesday, May 29, 2012

The Quantum Challenge

I have saved the issue of quantum mechanics for last, as it is the most difficult. Prof. Feser makes some very good points in his remarks on quantum mechanics and causality. To respond to these points fully, I would have to present a complete alternate account of causation and physical law, which I have neither the knowledge nor the time to do. (But see the paragraphs in parentheses below for a hint of how such an account might go.) But let me try to clarify my quantum challenge.

A point that I perhaps didn't make clear enough in my original post on the quantum challenge: the challenge comes primarily from the quantum phenomena themselves, and only secondarily from the theory of quantum mechanics. Regardless of what the theory says about the electron transitions that produce line spectra, the very existence and pattern of those transitions is what the Thomist must reconcile with his metaphysical views. Since Feser's response is directed at the theory of quantum mechanics and how it answers different questions than the metaphysical ones, that response is to some extent missing the point.

As an analogy, suppose someone were to discover a kind of pebble that behaves in every way like an ordinary pebble, except that, at some time during its existence, it suddenly turns into a puddle of goo. No external cause can be found for this strange transition. So, we look for an internal cause: some sort of internal structure that could explain the change. But slicing the pebble open reveals no such structure: the pebble seems to have a very simple composition. So we look deeper: perhaps there is some chemical change going on? But no such chemical changes can be found. And as time goes on, scientists continue to be unable to identify any cause of the change.

My claim is that the existence of a class of pebbles like these would call into question the principle "Whatever changes is changed by something else." And this would be the case regardless of any theoretical description of the puddling pebbles that scientists were able to work out. One could always hold out hope that an explanation of the change would someday be found. Or one could attempt to subsume the phenomenon under the principle by, for instance, pushing the "something else" that causes the change back to whatever brought the pebble into existence in the first place. But you can't claim that these pebbles are irrelevant to the principle.

My second point is that, whatever you make of the connection between natural laws and causes, it can't be true that the former is irrelevant to the latter, as Feser claims. This is clear even from his own book: every example of causation that Feser gives is implicitly or explicitly dependent on laws of nature.

For example, on p.54 he considers a rubber ball that becomes gooey when heated, and says that the heat is what actualizes the potential gooeyness of the ball.

This makes no sense unless we already know a natural law to the effect that "rubber becomes gooey when heated." For consider: suppose I place the ball on a hot plate and simultaneously wave my magic wand over it. After a while, it becomes gooey. Now, if natural laws are irrelevant to the question of causes, then it makes just as much sense to say that waving the wand was the cause, as it does to say the heat of the hot plate was the cause. In fact, it makes just as much sense to say that the flapping of a butterfly's wings was the cause, or the position of Jupiter in the sky. Without natural laws, we can have no conception of cause and effect.

I could continue to cite examples - breaking the glass with a brick (p.68: laws of force and fracture), the train pulling out of the station (p.95: laws of motion) - but I think you get the idea. In his latest post, Feser cautions against confusing illustrations of philosophical ideas with empirical evidence for them. The question remains: how can we know how causality works unless from our experience of actual causal sequences?

And if inertial motion is irrelevant to the First Way, then why does Michael Augros spend ten pages of this paper (PDF) dealing with the "problem" of inertial motion, and why is Feser himself writing a paper about it?

(One way to make the connection between laws and causes - if you'll forgive me getting technical for a bit - is via Hempel's deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation. On the DN model, a scientific explanation of a particular situation is a list of laws of nature, L1, L2, ... and a list of conditions, C1, C2, ... that guarantee the laws apply in this situation. Then the causes of the phenomenon can be identified as just the conditions, C1, C2, .... In the melting ball example, we would need (at least) a law of melting and a law of heat transfer. The conditions would include the contact between the ball and the hot plate, and the length of time they were in contact. Then we can clearly identify the hot plate as a cause of the ball's gooeyness - and likewise rule out the wand as a cause, as there is no natural law that would allow it to bring about the melting.

In this model the relationship between laws and causes is clear and explicit. This model has problems of its own, of course; it's just an example of the kind of account that Feser needs to give to make his position coherent.)

To be sure, Feser clearly realizes that there is a connection between our experience of the world and our concept of causality. In his first response, he wrote

Oerter ends his latest post with the remark that “It seems that physics is not, after all, irrelevant to metaphysics.”  Well, I don’t think I ever said that it is irrelevant.

And in this recent follow-up, he writes

Though metaphysics takes us well beyond the natural world, then, its concepts have a foundation in our empirical knowledge of that world -- to be sure, not necessarily in the knowledge of the specifics of the empirical world that natural science gives us, but in the knowledge of what must be true of any empirical world in general, which the philosophy of nature gives us.


 and

Now for the Aristotelian no less than for the empiricist, all of our concepts and all knowledge must ultimately derive from experience. 

In that post, he promises another response to my objections. Perhaps he will clarify how our concept of causation can be derived from experience, and yet the experience of quantum phenomena be irrelevant to that concept. 

Thirdly, Feser writes.
No, laws are not formal causes.

Good. Now will people please stop telling me that "the laws of quantum mechanics are the cause of electron transitions"? (This remark is directed at those commenters who made that claim, not at Dr. Feser.)

Finally, Feser writes

Now, along the same lines, we might say that the hydrogen atom also behaves as it does “spontaneously,” simply by virtue of having the substantial form it does.  Why do the electron transitions occur in just the pattern they do?  Because that’s the sort of thing that happens in anything having the substantial form of a hydrogen atom, just as gravitational attraction is the sort of thing that naturally happens in anything having a substantial form of the sort typical of material objects.  What is the efficient cause of this pattern?  The efficient cause is whatever brought a particular hydrogen atom into existence, just as the efficient cause of gravitational attraction is whatever brought a particular material object into existence.  That is one way, anyway, of giving an Aristotelian interpretation of QM phenomena of the sort cited by Oerter, and it is intended only as a sketch made for purposes of illustration rather than a completely worked out account.  But it shows how QM can be naturally fitted into the Aristotelian framework using concepts that already exist within the latter.

 This is actually very similar to what a physicist would say about the electron and its transitions. But it is a disaster for Feser's position. For, if spontaneous changes of state (with the emission of a photon) are just "the sort of thing that naturally happens" from time to time, then it is clearly not true that "Whatever changes is changed by something else." And so the First Way collapses.


I am not planning any more posts on The Last Superstition (which Prof. Feser will be glad to hear, I'm sure). Any further questions I have for him I'll post on the comments to his blog. Thanks to all of you who have taken part in the discussion, and biggest thanks to Prof. Feser for engaging my questions.
 

34 comments:

  1. Before responding I just want to take the time to express my appreciation to Prof Oerter for taking TLS seriously and seriously trying to tackle the issues raised by it(even if I think some of his specific approaches where technically flawed). You sir have clearly made a conscious effort to trying to understand a discipline that is outside your field and which you honestly and humbly up front confess to not being overly familiar with (i.e. Philosophy, and Metaphysics, specifically Classical Philosophy).

    It is refreshing all my good will to you sir for your efforts.

    Now for a brief response.

    >But slicing the pebble open reveals no such structure: the pebble seems to have a very simple composition. So we look deeper: perhaps there is some chemical change going on? But no such chemical changes can be found. And as time goes on, scientists continue to be unable to identify any cause of the change.

    This is still a "gap" argument and I can fill this "gap" with your Humean "Un-caused event god" or with Paley/Demblinki's "god" or the invisible pink unicorn.

    Or the cause could be a non-local phenomena?

    The concept of an "un-caused event" is still as philosophically coherent as claiming the existence of a four legged magic unicorn that magically has more legs than a five legged unicorn but less legs then a three legged unicorn while only having four legs.

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    1. "The concept of an 'un-caused event' is still as philosophically coherent as..."

      Nature does not have to conform to your "philosophic" idea of coherence. It's your philosophy that ultimately must conform to it (that is, if you're concerned about truth).

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    2. But we have no direct experience of it in nature at best we have a "gap" argument.
      But the concept itself is still logically incoherent.

      We can argue all day wither or not a horse or a unicorn made some horseshoe prints in the sand in the desert. But at the end of the day it would be incoherent to claim the horseshoe print are uncaused & or a magical unicorn with four legs only & at the same time 5 legs only made the prints.

      You can abandon reason but then you have no rational basis to proclaim anything.

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  2. Of course defining "un-caused" is also helpful.

    I have always assumed the definition of an "un-caused" event was an event or phenomena that happened without sufficient conditions and without necessity.

    Natural Laws of course are not formal causes but they might establish sufficient conditions.

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  3. Thanks, Ben. I appreciate having commenters who can disagree with me and with each other without the discussion degenerating into insult-slinging.

    Of course, you can fill the "gap" any way you like - IPU, God, or whatever. What you CAN'T do is pretend that these pebbles have no bearing on "Whatever changes is changed by something else."

    Ben wrote,

    "I have always assumed the definition of an "un-caused" event was an event or phenomena that happened without sufficient conditions and without necessity."

    Yes, and in the quantum situation we seem to have neither sufficient conditions nor necessity. We know what the necessary conditions are (electron in an excited state, coupling to electromagnetic field). But there seems to be no set of sufficient conditions: nothing that allows me to say "If X happens at time t1 then the electron will decay at time t2."

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  4. Peace to you boss. You da man!:-)

    >Of course, you can fill the "gap" any way you like - IPU, God, or whatever. What you CAN'T do is pretend that these pebbles have no bearing on "Whatever changes is changed by something else."

    Rather there is no way to use empirical science to falsify metaphysics & or philosophy. Anymore then (mis)using laws of physics (like the Second Law Law of Theromodynamics) as if it where a metaphysical principle can falsify something like evolution.

    Your responses though creative are basically catagory mistakes & thus prima facie invalid arguements. You need to read Feser's latest post.

    >Yes, and in the quantum situation we seem to have neither sufficient conditions nor necessity.

    Are you sure about that? Then why don't objects appear or disappear at the macro level? Maybe on the condition this type of phenomina has to happen at the sub-atomic level in which case one has to ask what is it about the sub-atomic level that is different from the macro-level we live in?

    It almost as if they have different properties.....

    >We know what the necessary conditions are (electron in an excited state, coupling to electromagnetic field).

    I think we are spliting hairs here over terms? I might consider this a sufficient condition.

    >But there seems to be no set of sufficient conditions: nothing that allows me to say "If X happens at time t1 then the electron will decay at time t2."

    Of course this particular pebbles changes when you measure or observe it thus you can't know what it was like before you measured/observed it. So you don't have all the information and still there is the idea of non-local hidden variables. Quantum spookyness etc two particles that have had contact behaving alike at a distance etc...

    So again I see no difference between you vs the ID guys here. Other then you both use gap arguments.

    I would first believe there is a natural non-local hidden variable here before I postulate magic of either the Atheistic or Theistic type.

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    1. >Rather there is no way to use empirical science to falsify metaphysics & or philosophy.

      I think I've been pretty clear that I don't think that the quantum phenomena can falsify metaphysics. The question is, rather, how can the principle "whatever changes is changed by something else" be applied to the quantum phenomena? What is the "something else" that effects the change? So far, Dr. Feser hasn't told us what he thinks that "something else" is.

      >Your responses though creative are basically catagory mistakes...

      If you accept the D-N model, then laws have everything to do with causes. There is no category mistake here. Clearly, Feser doesn't accept that model. But he hasn't explained what the alternative is: how he sees the connection between laws and causes. His claim that the one is irrelevant to the other is invalidated by his constant references to natural laws in his book.

      Maybe the answers are all there in Aquinas. But from what Feser gives me in TLS, I just can't see them.

      >I think we are spliting hairs here over terms? I might consider this a sufficient condition.

      I'm not sure you understand what "sufficient condition" means.

      "A sufficient condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that, if satisfied, guarantees that S obtains. "

      If we have sufficient conditions for a decay, then those conditions guarantee the decay has occurred. You can't have sufficient conditions for a decay, and then have the electron sit around for weeks, or months, or years, before decaying.

      >I would first believe there is a natural non-local hidden variable here before I postulate magic of either the Atheistic or Theistic type.

      You can postulate whatever supernatural quantities you like as the "cause" of the decay. I showed in my filter argument that such quantities have no physical (i.e. measurable) meaning.

      (I note that, to his credit, Dr. Feser hasn't taken the route of relying on unobservable non-local hidden variables as his out.)

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    2. >I think I've been pretty clear that I don't think that the quantum phenomena can falsify metaphysics.

      That is not the impression I've gotten from reading your responses. Maybe I misunderstood you? I don’t deny that is possible.

      >The question is, rather, how can the principle "whatever changes is changed by something else" be applied to the quantum phenomena? What is the "something else" that effects the change? So far, Dr. Feser hasn't told us what he thinks that "something else" is.

      The ambiguity here is in "be applied".

      Applied how? As a philosophical principle? Scientifically?

      If we can’t discover the identity of a particular causal agent in a particular case that does not lead to the conclusion “therefore it was un-caused” or “whatever changes is changed by something else” is false.

      I don’t see how he need too show something else specifically? Especially since the principle “from nothing, nothing comes” is very strong.

      > Clearly, Feser doesn't accept that model. But he hasn't explained what the alternative is: how he sees the connection between laws and causes. His claim that the one is irrelevant to the other is invalidated by his constant references to natural laws in his book.

      So it will be helpful if we go into more detail on the Pre vs the Post Humean views on Causality.
      This will go a long way to keep us from talking past each other.

      >I'm not sure you understand what "sufficient condition" means.

      Well it’s more then likely we don’t have the same terminology in common. Conditions that allow evens to happen. Sure fire has the heat that will melt ice but the ice has to be in certain proximity to the heat to melt.

      >If we have sufficient conditions for a decay, then those conditions guarantee the decay has occurred. You can't have sufficient conditions for a decay, and then have the electron sit around for weeks, or months, or years, before decaying.

      So you are thinking of immediate causal conditions I most likely am thinking about real potential conditions.

      I’m an Aristotlian your kinda Newtonian. Toe-May Toe! Ta-mato!etc…

      > You can postulate whatever supernatural quantities you like as the "cause" of the decay.

      I personally believe a non-local hidden variable would be a natural phenomena. My point is the idea this points to an “un-caused event” is no better than a “gap” argument.

      > I showed in my filter argument that such quantities have no physical (i.e. measurable) meaning.

      Which does not mean in principle it can’t be measured. It could mean our current level of technology can’t measure it. Let’s face it based on the scientific tools he had at the time Galileo could not prove the Earth moved. It would take a few centuries before science could conclusively prove the Earth moved.

      Anyway I look forward to seeing you over at Feser’s blog. Stop by sit a spell.

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    3. "Rather there is no way to use empirical science to falsify metaphysics & or philosophy. Anymore then (mis)using laws of physics (like the Second Law Law of Theromodynamics) as if it where a metaphysical principle can falsify something like evolution."

      Metaphysics is based on the physics we observe. There is no metaphysics without it. So if the observations are wrong, the metaphysics is in doubt. But you cannot turn this around. It's absurd (and pretentious) to claim the physics is based on metaphysics. So yes, empirical science can falsify your metaphysics. You, in fact, indirectly agree to this every time you claim there can be no uncaused cause (except God), because you depend on observations to support your claim against those whose (false?) metaphysics would hold otherwise.

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    4. "Rather there is no way to use empirical science to falsify metaphysics & or philosophy. Anymore then (mis)using laws of physics (like the Second Law Law of Theromodynamics) as if it where a metaphysical principle can falsify something like evolution."

      Metaphysics is based on physics, not the other way around. So yes, empirical science can falsify metaphysics. You implicitly agree to this otherwise you would have no hope of countering those who embrace a (false?) metaphysics that holds that there can, indeed, be uncaused causes.

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    5. >Metaphysics is based on physics, not the other way around.

      Says the anti-realist who in the past has defended (quite badly) Nominalism.

      Premeditates after all held to a metaphysics that said change was an illusion. In fact modern physicists who believe in the "unreality of time" are in effect embracing the metaphysics of Premeditates.

      How would you use empiricism to falsify that?

      Like I said you are are like the weirdo who denies the existence of galaxies because you can't see them under your microscope.

      Don't waste my time djindra.

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  5. Robert,

    I think one of your biggest problems in understanding Feser is your belief in "laws of nature". For the Aristotelian, they don't exist. David Oderberg, while discussing this problem, renamed them the "laws of natures"--i.e. intrinsic properties of things. There is no "law of melting", but, rather, specific things that melt as a result of their essential natures. The idea of laws is left over from the Enlightenment, when philosophers and scientists, after banishing Aristotle's philosophy of nature from the debate, decided that reality must have been ordered according to laws that God imposed from the outside. This soon proved infeasible.

    My claim is that the existence of a class of pebbles like these would call into question the principle "Whatever changes is changed by something else." And this would be the case regardless of any theoretical description of the puddling pebbles that scientists were able to work out. One could always hold out hope that an explanation of the change would someday be found. Or one could attempt to subsume the phenomenon under the principle by, for instance, pushing the "something else" that causes the change back to whatever brought the pebble into existence in the first place. But you can't claim that these pebbles are irrelevant to the principle.

    If there were a dozen interpretive frameworks proposed for the puddling pebble, and none of them were more likely than the others based on empirical evidence alone, then what happens? Do you go with the interpretation that considers the change "uncaused" and casts doubt on scientific prediction of any event, the interpretation that the pebbles create an infinite number of worlds, the interpretation that the pebbles are melted by other pebbles at the edge of the universe (at the same time violating relativity), or the interpretation that proposes a time-travel-esque mechanic? Or perhaps some other interpretation?

    At the same time, as Feser wrote, the Aristotelian could simply say that spontaneous melting was part of the nature of these pebbles. The power to melt at an unquantifiable time was actualized when the pebbles were created. Not every event needs to be caused by "something bumping into something else", so to speak. Consider, for example, this article that I post everywhere: http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/04/5119. The Aristotelian would say that the directedness in this case is part of the nature of the thing in question. Scientists cannot quantify the event via "something bumping into something else", and so it seems fundamentally mysterious and possibly "uncaused". For the Aristotelian, it was caused; but this cause was the object's creation, and the more fundamental processes that sustain the object in existence. The directedness is not reducible to these more fundamental processes, but the Aristotelian essentialist already believed in irreducible natures and causal powers; so this comes as no surprise.

    Likewise, there is nothing in a puddling pebble that casts doubt on the principle of causality. If, for some reason, no direct cause is discovered, the Aristotelian will merely say that melting is an irreducible, unquantifiable causal power that pebbles have by nature. They gained this power when they were created, and they continue to possess it because more fundamental things hold them in existence. Puddling pebbles might be a death blow to "something bumping into something else"-style causality, but Aristotelians are unharmed.

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    1. >I think one of your biggest problems in understanding Feser is your belief in "laws of nature".

      On the contrary, I think Prof. Feser and I agree for the most part on the laws of nature: that they are descriptions, rather than commands; and that they encapsulate the inherent qualities of the actually existing objects in the universe.

      >If, for some reason, no direct cause is discovered, the Aristotelian will merely say that melting is an irreducible, unquantifiable causal power that pebbles have by nature.

      Which invalidates the claim that "Whatever changes is changed by something else." Because these pebbles change without a "something else" to change them.

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    2. >Because these pebbles change without a "something else" to change them.

      Rather any actualized potential must be actualized by something already actual is what the principle means.

      It is after all a metaphysical principle not a law of physics an any sense of the word.

      By virtue of the fact these pebbles are actualized fully as pebbles they actualize their nature power to melt by nature.

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    3. "Rather any actualized potential must be actualized by something already actual is what the principle means."

      An asteroid hurls through space and impacts earth with a huge explosion. Which "actualized" which? Was it in the earth's nature to catch and explode incoming objects or was it in the asteroid's nature to pummel planets with explosions? Or was it in the sun's nature to hold planets and asteroids captive assuming explosions would result? Seems to me that the actual is always in at least two different places. It doesn't pass neatly from one object to another. There is no direction to it.

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    4. If an asteroid hits the Earth who says only one potency has to be actualized for that event?

      Weird.

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    5. >Seems to me that the actual is always in at least two different places.


      ???????????????????

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    6. An asteroid hurls through space and impacts earth with a huge explosion. Which "actualized" which? Was it in the earth's nature to catch and explode incoming objects or was it in the asteroid's nature to pummel planets with explosions? Or was it in the sun's nature to hold planets and asteroids captive assuming explosions would result? Seems to me that the actual is always in at least two different places. It doesn't pass neatly from one object to another. There is no direction to it.

      1. Some scenarios involve two or more actualizations.

      2. These actualizations can be extremely complex and difficult to trace.

      3. Therefore, there are no causal chains.

      This is a textbook non sequitur.

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    7. rank sophist, Thank you for your comment! It is so nice when someone trained so precisely encapsulates my amateurish thoughts! Very encouraging. I need to get into this stuff more.

      Loved this segment: 'The Aristotelian would say that the directedness in this case is part of the nature of the thing in question. Scientists cannot quantify the event via "something bumping into something else", and so it seems fundamentally mysterious and possibly "uncaused". For the Aristotelian, it was caused; but this cause was the object's creation, and the more fundamental processes that sustain the object in existence.'

      Causality has been on my mind for several years, but I have never given it serious study. Look forward now to reading the article you linked.

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  6. Feser and his sycophants readily appeal to our experience of nature when it suits their purposes, and then declare our experience irrelevant when nature proves inconvenient.

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    1. Again with the bald accusations, BI? Make an argument.

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    2. "Feser and his sycophants readily appeal to our experience of nature when it suits their purposes, and then declare our experience irrelevant when nature proves inconvenient."

      That's for sure.

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    3. Like... when nature demands ceasing inquiry at the seeming perception of uncaused effects? Is this how we know when the work of science is finished? A time to rest in the escape hatch gap of incoherency. Ought to be heretical.

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    4. I want to figure out what "is," and how that happened. Physics works towards figuring that out, metaphysics comes from that physics ... period.

      Keeping arguments in a "metaphysical safe" then stating someone cannot challenge those metaphysics unless that person is inside the same safe arguing with you doesn't seem valid.

      If you're after what "is" then you need to argue from all possible "safes," (using this analogy) not just the safe you're comfortable arguing from.

      Physics is describing a lot more and more accurately (although not perfectly) than Aristotle did, and no amount of semantic arguing under the guise of "philosophy" is changing that.

      There are unanswered (or not fully answered) questions, let's keep pursuing them.

      But I would say it would be a better approach to discover how we can work together on an interdisciplinary level to actually answer them than to keep arguing from our comfortable "safes."

      Schrodinger wrote "What is Life" and it changed the way we look at things (yes I know, argument from authority), instead of relying on tired arguments and quibbling about semantics.

      It just doesn't seem like this entire argument of Aristotlean metaphysics (Feser) versus Physics (Oerter) is getting anywhere except "Who is right" and "Who is wrong" (and that hasn't been determined either).

      Who has the answers? (Because I don't)

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  7. Rob, I'd like to thank you for your contributions to this enjoyable series of exchanges. I appreciate it and have learned much.

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  8. Seriously this has been one of the most enjoyable debates I have ever had with an intelligent Atheist (PhD level) who seriously tried to engage the subject.

    Cheers.

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  9. Prof Feser writes his latest response.


    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/06/oerter-on-motion-and-first-mover.html

    I tried to post this a few days ago but the Net was slow for some reason and I got sidetracked into other things.

    Enjoy.

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  10. I tried to think of an analogy that would illustrate the uncertainty of the time that an electron would fall or that a radioactive atom would activate. This is what I came up with:
    Visualize a shell about a nucleus that prohibits an electron from falling toward the nucleus (or prohibits radiation from coming out). Imagine also that when an unstable atom is created, there is also a very small hole in the shell that permits transfer beyond the shell when the particle happens to be lined up with the hole (imagine also that atoms with less stability have more holes for this to happen).
    Now, if the particles move about on the surface of the shell in a way that eventually covers every point of this surface, each atom's half-life will correspond to the number of holes in that shell (the speed with which the particles cover the surface may also play a part).
    This illustrates a happening that has no external cause.

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    1. Of course it doesn't really need an "external cause" just a cause. Aquinas said animals "move themselves" but he certainly didn't think Animal movements where A-causal.

      Cheers.

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  11. Dr Oerter,

    Feser just wrote:

    "The Aristotelian theory of act and potency is the classic example of such a piece of middle ground knowledge. It is grounded in the basic empirical datum, the fact of change. But it is not a description of this or that particular change or this or that particular kind of change but rather of all change as such. Hence while empirically grounded it is not subject to falsification by theorizing in physics, chemistry, etc., because the phenomena dealt with in all such theorizing, since they all involve change, implicitly presuppose the theory of act and potency."

    Do you think that is correct? Do physicists presuppose this metaphysics?

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    1. TTT, would love to see a response to BeingItself from Dr Oerter.

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  12. BI

    If your are going to quote Feser at least have the curtsy of giving the Professor a link on the subject at large. So he can read all quotes in context.

    PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY OF [fill in the blank].

    http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/06/philosophy-of-nature-and-philosophy-of.html

    No need to thank me.

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