Newton's law states that anything that is in motion will remain in motion unless acted on by an outside force, so the two principles seem to be directly contradictory, at least at first glance. Newton says that an object that is completely isolated, so that it has no external influences on it, will continue to move. Aquinas denies this.
So how does Feser resolve the conflict? Easy! The object in uniform motion is moved along by....
(wait for it)
ANGELS!
Yes, angels are necessary to keep a moving object moving. I'm not making this up, he really says it:
So, it is difficult to see how inertial motion, when interpreted as involving real change, could have a physical cause. But as we implied above, even if its lacks a physical cause, there is nothing in the principle of inertia that rules out a metaphysical cause. Indeed, if inertial motion involves real change, then given the principle of motion together with the absence of a physical cause, such a metaphysical cause is necessary.
Of course, that raises the question of what exactly this metaphysical cause is....
If inertial motion involves real change, then, only a metaphysical cause external to the moving object could be the ultimate source. And we already have a model for such a cause in the Aristotelian tradition. For the motions of celestial bodies were in that tradition regarded as unending, just as inertial motion is (barring interference from outside forces) unending; and while this view was associated with a mistaken astronomy, a metaphysical kernel can be extracted from the obsolete scientific husk. Now the causes of celestial motion in this earlier Aristotelian tradition were, of course, intelligent or angelic substances....
Hence the only possible cause of inertial motion—again, at least if it is considered to involve real change—would seem to be a necessarily existing intelligent substance or substances, of the sort the earlier Aristotelian tradition thought moved celestial objects. (Unless it is simply God Himself causing it directly as Unmoved Mover.)
Here Feser is considering inertial motion as "real change." He also considers what happens if you consider inertial motion as a "state" that doesn't involve any real change: no actualization of a potential. Feser seems to be getting confused by the way physicists use the term "state": the "state" of a (classical) object refers to its location and its rate of change (velocity), so by definition it involves change. Ultimately, though, the question of whether inertial motion is or is not "real change" is not a physical question but a metaphysical one. One would think that Feser's Aristotelian-Thomian metaphysics would tell us which it is. That it cannot just shows how useless that metaphysics is.
The idea that angels are responsible for inertial motion raises a whole (heavenly) host of questions. Presumably, an object at rest doesn't need any angelic mover. However, in Newtonian physics, any uniformly moving reference frame can be considered to be at rest (Galilean relativity). If we have two objects in uniform motion relative to each other, which one does the angel need to guide? If we consider object A at rest, then the angel must move B. But if we consider object B at rest, then the angel must move A. What's a poor angel to do?
And how many angels are needed for this heavenly guidance? If an asteroid is being guided by an angel, and suffers an impact that splits it in two, does the angel recruit another angel to guide the second piece? Or can the first angel handle both pieces? What if the asteroid gets shattered into smaller and smaller fragments? Maybe each elementary particle has its own angel? How many angels are needed to guide a fragment the size of a pin? (And do they dance?)
Once again we see the Sophisticated Theologian in action. When the world doesn't work the way you want it to, just invent some invisible, undetectable beings to fill the gap.
I have to thank Prof. Feser for this paper; it shows more clearly than anything I could write what absurdities result when you try to force the world into a pre-conceived metaphysics.
That is... amazing.
ReplyDeleteI haven't read Feser on this, but in defense of the idea that inertial motion is a "state" one can adopt the Newtonian/Galilean relativity you invoked in your post. More broadly, given some Relativity principle (Galilean, Special, General, or even - per Victor Stenger - Functional/Quantum) only the invariant quantities (scalars) are seen as "real"; the relative quantities are, well, how these objective realities are seen from a certain reference frame.
That said, however, things like relative velocity (i.e. velocity between two systems) are invariant (under Galilean relativity), so one can't simply write-off velocity as a static "state" - it is at least a set of states, each implying different dynamics relative to other inertial systems. Most broadly, under General relativity inertial motion is the invariant property of following the geodesic - and is hence a property of the object's in spacetime (well, in a limited area thereof); I'm not sure if that counts as a "state", seems more like a property of the object/state to me!
Cheers,
Yair
Do yourself a favor Yair read for yourself.
DeleteProf has a tendency to misread and misinterpret Feser big time & his tendency to conflate philosophy with science & or physics with metaphysics because of his latent positivism (which he denies believing but to date it's like me listening to a Protestant Tell me he believes in Sola Scriptura not Solo Scriptura) makes the issue into more pea soup.
It's very frustrating.
If you read this post which is linked above
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/06/oerter-on-motion-and-first-mover.html
Feser spells out Prof Oerter misreadings & misunderstandings in painful detail.
I don't know it's like a Senior who majors in biology arguing with a Creationist who has a 6th graders understanding of biology & a handful of creationist tracts.
What is it about some modern physicists that they can't understand philosophy or the difference between philosophy vs science to save their lives?
I'm going to go claim down.
Oy Vey!!!!!!!
This comment has been removed by the author.
Delete>I haven't read Feser on this, but in defense of the idea that inertial motion is a "state" one can adopt the Newtonian/Galilean relativity you invoked in your post.
DeleteOf course the point of Feser's paper (to those who would read it rather then merely glance at it)is the medieval principle of motion(via Aquinas) and the modern principle of inertia are not in conflict.
Feser argues this is true wither or not you model inertia as either a form of change or a state.
He makes passing reference to Aristotle's belief celestial intelligences moved the spheres and referencing to the classic First Cause argument explains how if that where the case the celestial powers would still need an Un-moved mover.
But that is not the same as claiming he is claiming angels move the world.
Granted this all relates back to Aquinas' First Way which is if anything not a gap argument.
Read it yourself.
I'm calm now but wow this post is just so wrong.
Even in a godless universe this post is so off base.
Tell me I'm wrong.
Your full of Shit Prof Oerter!
ReplyDeleteI read that paper Feser nowhere claims or is arguing that Angels move the world.
You are misrepresenting him big time.
Did you even read this paper? Clearly not.
>One would think that Feser's Aristotelian-Thomian metaphysics would tell us which it is. That it cannot just shows how useless that metaphysics is.
Positivism on crack!
>Yes, angels are necessary to keep a moving object moving. I'm not making this up, he really says it:
ReplyDeleteNo he is not. Anyone who reads English can see that!
Oy Vey!
Wow. How utterly, and surprisingly, dishonest. I had expected better of you. Silly me.
ReplyDeleteMaybe he is not dishonest merely lazy?
DeleteStill he is killing me!
Killing me!
>Newton says that an object that is completely isolated, so that it has no external influences on it, will continue to move. Aquinas denies this.
ReplyDeleteYep you didn't read the Paper.
QUOTE"As James A. Weisheipl has shown, the idea that Aristotle and Aquinas held that no object can continue its local motion unless some mover is continuously conjoined to it is something of an urban legend.(footnote 12)"END QUOTE
I really do like your Prof Oerter. Make no mistake on that I do like you but
you are killing me here!
Oy Vey!
Wow, indeed.
ReplyDeleteOK, obviously it was a sarcastic post, but "dishonest"? How, exactly? Did I not quote exactly what Prof. Feser wrote? Did he not write, "Hence the only possible cause of inertial motion—again, at least if it is considered to involve real change—would seem to be a necessarily existing intelligent substance or substances, of the sort the earlier Aristotelian tradition thought moved celestial objects"?
Does that not say that angelic substances or God are the only possible cause of inertial motion (in the case under consideration)?
I wish someone would explain the charge of dishonesty to me.
As you know, that you've quoted someone does not entail that you've represented his views honestly. Context is everything.
DeleteYou give your readers the impression that I think that angels are the cause of inertial motion, and that an appeal to angels is needed in order to reconcile Newton and Aquinas. Neither of which is true.
For the record, I do NOT think that angels are the cause of inertial motion, and the brief remark about angels was in any case merely a sub-point within a sub-point within a sub-point. I was saying "IF you take the non-stasis view about the nature of inertial motion and IF you reject these alternative interpretations of that view and IF you reject the claim that the Unmoved Mover is the direct cause of inertial motion THEN an angelic cause would seem to be the only alternative." But I never said that I endorse every or even any of the options in that particular decision tree. Yet you've given the impression that my paper is about angels and that I endorse the claim that angels cause the inertial motion of asteroids, particles, etc. That is dishonest.
You've also either ignored or failed to understand the logic of the view I was describing (without endorsing). It's not some silly "angel of the gaps" argument. Here you're just appealing to the New Atheist mob, who are sure to get some cheap giggles at the word "angel" without bothering to understand exactly what a writer like Aquinas means by that term.
But since I don't endorse the view myself in the first place, that is, I suppose, a lesser offense.
So I correctly interpreted your paper to say that, within the subcase in question, the only possible cause of inertial motion is angels or God.
DeleteAnd I explicitly mentioned that you treated other cases.
And I provided a link to the paper so that anyone could read the whole thing.
Yet you call me "dishonest". Because I didn't give a complete summary of the whole paper?
This is blog, not a philosophy journal, Prof. Feser. I pointed to one part of your paper that I found amusing. I did not misquote you, or combine quotes to make you seem to say something you didn't say. I certainly had no intention to deceive anyone about what you wrote. And, according to what you wrote here, I seem to have interpreted the section in question as you intended it, so I didn't deceive anyone unintentionally, either.
I was not dishonest, sir.
Feser wrote:
DeleteI was saying "IF you take the non-stasis view about the nature of inertial motion..."
Which I explicitly mentioned.
Feser wrote:
and IF you reject these alternative interpretations of that view...
Which you reject yourself, so why do I need to mention the impetus interpretation?
Feser wrote:
and IF you reject the claim that the Unmoved Mover is the direct cause of inertial motion
Which possibility is included right there in the part I quoted.
Feser wrote:
THEN an angelic cause would seem to be the only alternative."
Which is what I said you said.
"OK, obviously it was a sarcastic post"
DeleteNope, it was a smear job. But now that you've been caught, you are retreating to "sarcasm."
Feser quite obviously said, "In Aristotilean metaphysics, here is one way this might be handled." He very, very obviously did not endorse that solution.
Now your just digging yourself in deeper Prof Oerter.
DeleteMan up already and admit you did not read the paper and you grievously misrepresented it.
>So I correctly interpreted your paper to say that, within the subcase in question, the only possible cause of inertial motion is angels or God.
Where did you make a reference to "subcase" Prof Oerter you said Feser believed Angels moved celestial objects?
>I was not dishonest, sir.
I was willing to believe that but the more you refuse to own your mistake the worst it gets for you & it become near impossible for a defense of your character in this particular incident.
>This is blog, not a philosophy journal,
Your a fellow academic even if you are not a philosopher and have admitted in the past to being incompetent in the area of philosophy.
You have a duty not to even give the appearance of smearing a fellow academic.
Make no mistake. Your wrong here sir.
Man up and own it. It will free you.
Prof Oerter should I believe my own eyes?
DeleteDid you or did you not write the following?
So how does Feser resolve the conflict? Easy! The object in uniform motion is moved along by....
(wait for it)
ANGELS!
Yes, angels are necessary to keep a moving object moving. I'm not making this up, he really says it:.........Once again we see the Sophisticated Theologian in action. When the world doesn't work the way you want it to, just invent some invisible, undetectable beings to fill the gap.
I have to thank Prof. Feser for this paper; it shows more clearly than anything I could write what absurdities result when you try to force the world into a pre-conceived metaphysics.
So you are either obtuse since you clearly didn't read the paper or you are dishonest.
Because it is obvious Feser did not say Angels moved objects or enforced the idea as you clearly claimed he did above(he was referencing Aristotle who did).
>And I provided a link to the paper so that anyone could read the whole thing.
Why would any Gnus who read your slanderous misrepresentation bother looking it up?
>Yet you call me "dishonest". Because I didn't give a complete summary of the whole paper?
No because you clearly didn't give an accurate summery and as I pointed out you clearly read all of it.
You clearly didn't read the whole Paper.
DeleteAdmit it Prof Oerter. It's as plain as the nose on my face.
Prof Oerter,
ReplyDeleteYou brought this on yourself.
One of Feser's regulars wrote in the comm box of his blog.
QUOTE"Amazing, it seems that Oerter is just going, and interpreting what he most likely feels is the correct interpretation instead of slowly reading the text and trying to see what the author is up to, what are the interpretations to what the author is saying..."END QUOTE
You wrote:
>OK, obviously it was a sarcastic post, but "dishonest"? How, exactly? Did I not quote exactly what Prof. Feser wrote?
It's not obvious unless you added a clear disclaimer you where not serious with this post but it seems you left that part out.
Merely quoting part of Feser's essay even if you did it "exactly" then reading into it a meaning that is not plain to those of us who actually read the whole thing in context is not going to fool anyone.
>I wish someone would explain the charge of dishonesty to me.
Your a public Atheist critic of religious belief and a professional academic. One would think you have better to offer us then the flippant mockery of teenage internet Atheists with 1/100th your education.
One would have thought you would have read it carefully. But as I showed above with your crack about "Aquinas denies this.." that is not the case now is it?
Even if we say Feser should have shown heroic charity & not called you "dishonest" you can still hardly blame him now can you?
What if you wrote a serious academic paper on physics and Feser misread it & treated it like a philosophy paper & misrepresented it & or read into in such as way as to make you look ridiculous? He could most likely do so quoting your exact words. It's not hard. A text without a context and so forth.....
I think you would have cause to be annoyed if the shoe where on the other foot?
Tell me I'm wrong.
>Does that not say that angelic substances or God are the only possible cause of inertial motion (in the case under consideration)?
ReplyDeleteNo it does not. How do you get that?
Feser is clearly broadly arguing that the metaphysical view of motion(i.e. change & or a potency becoming actual) is compatible with Newtonian Physics including various views that treat inertia as either change or a state.
He is merely making the modest point if Aristotle's view of angelic necessary powers where even true they would still metaphysically require something that is Pure Act to account for their existence.
I missed both the parts where he is making a gap argument and claiming Aristotle is making a true description of reality.
It's not hard.
> I missed both the parts where he is making a gap argument and claiming Aristotle is making a true description of reality.
DeleteI missed the part where Feser distanced himself from the angel scenario as a serious answer to one of the serious ways to understand inertia.
He casts doubt on the impetus hypothesis for an answer to inertia-as-movement just before presenting the angel hypothesis. He doesn't similarly cast doubt on the angel hypothesis before moving on to the alternative of inertia-as-stasis.
What is offered as serious suggestion may be treated as one.
"What is offered as serious suggestion may be treated as one."
DeleteBut what is offered as "Here is one way some thinkers might have handled this" may NOT be held up as an author's own views!
There seems to be an equivocation in several comments here between saying:
Delete(1) Feser believes X is actually the case.
and
(2) Feser offers X as a reasonable response to a certain kind of criticism.
I got (2) from reading the paper, though admittedly not (1). If I--or anyone else--criticizes (2), it's not appropriate to defend against an imagined criticism of (1).
Your full of shit too Garren trying to shift the burden.
ReplyDeleteFeser doesn't have to "distanced himself" from anything. The theme of the Paper & his aims are self evident to anybody who has taken the time to read it.
If Prof Dawkins wrote an academic Paper on evolution & mentioned Lemark in passing & or some feature of Lemarkism in reference to modern evolution does Dawkins have to spill ink with a disclaimer that Lemark's theory is scientifically anachronistic and that he doesn't hold it?
You people are killing me.
When defending the relevancy of medieval and ancient philosophy, there is a much greater need to clarify which old ideas are being held up as relevant and which are no longer live options.
DeleteBesides, the mention of angels was not merely in passing or to illustrate something else; a metaphysical person (or persons) causing inertial motion _was_ the answer to a contemporary avenue of attack against Aquinas' First Way.
>Besides, the mention of angels was not merely in passing or to illustrate something else; a metaphysical person (or persons) causing inertial motion _was_ the answer to a contemporary avenue of attack against Aquinas' First Way.
DeleteReally?
QUOTE"So, it is difficult to see how inertial motion, when interpreted as involving real change, could have a physical cause. But as we implied above, even if its lacks a physical cause, there is nothing in the principle of inertia that rules out a metaphysical cause."END QUOTE
Do you even know the difference between a metaphysical cause vs physical one? Do you even know the difference betweem science vs philosophy of nature?
I doubt you do.
Final point.
DeleteQUOTE"If inertial motion involves real change, then, only a metaphysical cause external to the moving object could be the ultimate source. And we already have a model for such a cause in the Aristotelian tradition."END QUOTE
Since when are models literal? I've seen people cite Babylonian Creation Myths as philosophical models for Atheist Cosmology. That doesn't logically follow the modeller or Atheists literally believe in Babylonian Creation myths.
"When defending the relevancy of medieval and ancient philosophy, there is a much greater need to clarify which old ideas are being held up as relevant and which are no longer live options."
DeleteWho said necessarily existing intelligent substances weren't a "live option" in metaphysics? The point here is that Feser doesn't endorse them as an explanation of inertia. The only thing he has to do in order to avoid endorsing them is not endorse them.
But for the purpose of relating the principle of motion to the principle of inertia, they are one possible option among others (namely, in the case in which we take inertia as not static, i.e., as involving the actualization of potency), and he lists them as such. There's nothing he needs to "distance himself" from.
Or did you mean he should have distanced himself from Oerter's clownish caricature of the idea of "necessarily existing intelligent substances"? I don't see why. He was very obviously writing for an audience of greater philosophical sophistication than Oerter apparently possesses, and who could safely be expected not to respond like buffoons.
No, the only fault here belongs to Oerter, who saw an opportunity to entertain his own audience with a little cheap humor and didn't mind being dishonest in the process.
The only alternative is that he's preternaturally obtuse, and if he wants to cop to that instead, I won't argue. But either way, the idea that in an academic paper Feser should take steps to make sure he doesn't say anything a liar or fool could make fun of on the Internet . . . well, that's just ridiculous.
>When defending the relevancy of medieval and ancient philosophy, there is a much greater need to clarify which old ideas are being held up as relevant and which are no longer live options.
ReplyDeleteOh you mean like this?
QUOTE" Though Aristotle and pre-modern Aristotelians did not clearly distinguish the metaphysical aspects of their analysis of nature from the physical ones (in the modern sense of “physical”), these aspects can in fact be clearly distinguished. In particular, questions about what the natural world must be like in order for any natural science at all to be possible must be distinguished from questions about what, as a matter of contingent fact, are the laws that govern that world. The latter questions are the proper study of physics, chemistry, biology, and the like. The former are the proper study of that branch of metaphysics known as the philosophy of nature. Geocentrism, the ancient theory of the elements, and the notion that objects have specific places to which they naturally move, are examples of Aristotelian ideas in physics that have been decisively superseded. But the theory of act and potency, the doctrine of the four causes, and the hylemorphic analysis of material objects as composites of form and matter are examples of notions which have (so the contemporary Aristotelian argues) abiding value as elements of a sound philosophy of nature."END QUOTE
Talk to me when you read the whole paper and do the backround reading.
Till then stop embarrassing yourself.
> Oh you mean like this?
ReplyDeleteYes, like that, except about intelligent metaphysical agents causing inertial motion.
*consolidating replies to Ben*
> Really?
Yes, what you quoted lines up quite well with what I said. It doesn't make a lot of sense for you to be quoting and bolding like you are if you're trying to disagree with me.
So you wish to continue embarrassing yourself?
ReplyDelete>Yes, like that, except about intelligent metaphysical agents causing inertial motion.
Of course anybody who has read the whole thing would not need him to needlessly spill the ink needed for such a useless redundant disclaimer.
Unless one had some tribal need to defend Prof Oerter incompetent initial misreading at all costs?
>Yes, what you quoted lines up quite well with what I said. It doesn't make a lot of sense for you to be quoting and bolding like you are if you're trying to disagree with me.
Rather I am trying to point out you like Prof Oerter didn't read the whole article otherwise neither of you would have made such irrational silly demands.
Feser takes Prof Oerter to task in public over the Paper he clearly didn't read.
ReplyDeletehttp://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/01/oerter-on-inertial-motion-and-angels.html#more
Repeat after me Prof Oerter.
Feser does not offer angels as an explanation for inertia.
But... Inertial motion doesn't even exist at all except as an approximation: no physical object in the universe is isolated. No matter how little the external influences are, they will always exist.
ReplyDeleteI don't see how a phenomenon completely inexistent in the real world could be regarded as the confutation of any theory or conception whatsoever.
Oh please. You wrote:
ReplyDeleteEd Feser has a new paper out explaining why Newton's First Law of Motion is not incompatible with Aquinas's principle that "whatever is in motion is moved by another." ...
So how does Feser resolve the conflict? Easy! The object in uniform motion is moved along by....
(wait for it)
ANGELS!
Yes, angels are necessary to keep a moving object moving. I'm not making this up, he really says it:
Etc.
Now, obviously, anyone who read only your post would conclude from this that I endorse the "angel" view and that defending it is a large part of what the paper is about, indeed the main thesis of the paper. None of which is true.
And spare me the "I linked to your paper" dodge. You know how things go in the blogosphere. Many, perhaps most, readers will not bother to read the original article, especially after you've made it sound so stupid.
I really am surprised and disappointed. I expected better of you.
"Feser seems to be getting confused by the way physicists use the term 'state': the 'state' of a (classical) object refers to its location and its rate of change (velocity), so by definition it involves change."
ReplyDeleteThis is wrong too, and Feser isn't "getting confused" by anything. In distinguishing the cases Feser is discussing at that stage of his argument, the very point at issue is whether what physicists mean by "change" really involves what Aristotelian metaphysicians mean by it.
A four-dimensional block universe would include curves to which differential calculus can be applied and derivatives ("rates of change") could be calculated, but it would not for that reason involve change at a metaphysical level.
Incidentally, since Feser explicitly discusses a static block universe in the paper you claim to have read, once again you can defend against the charge of duplicity only by invoking profound stupidity.
ReplyDeleteHaving read the original paper, my position is that Feser failed to successfully argue that inertial change in *position* can be seen as a "state". This leaves it as a real-change only. His presentation of that option leaves open only external eternal sustaining (i.e. non-force affecting) causes*. Thus, I conclude that Feser fails to argue that the two principles are compatible in a *satisfying* manner. The two principles can only be made compatible by multiplying entities and causal relations.
ReplyDelete* Add in "intelligent", and you get angels, yes. I fail to see why Feser adds that qualifier, though, so I'll just ignore that...
Yair
http://thebiganswers.wordpress.com/2013/01/08/principle-of-motion-versus-inertia/
@Yair
ReplyDelete>Having read the original paper, my position is that Feser failed to successfully argue that inertial change in *position* can be seen as a "state".
Considering the Theme of the Paper was QUOTE" the familiar claim that Newton’s law of inertia has undermined the argument of Aquinas’s First Way," END QUOTE why would Feser be arguing "inertial change in *position* can be seen as a "state" if that is not his theme?
Are you serious?
FYI(from those of us who both read the paper & are familiar with the back round philosophy) he doesn't argue it he assumes it for purposes of argument to show how it is not incompatible with the Aristotelian POM.
It's a philosophy paper not a physics paper.
Do you understand the difference?
>This leaves it as a real-change only.
Which he also argues is compatible with the First Way.
>His presentation of that option leaves open only external eternal sustaining (i.e. non-force affecting) causes*.
He already states QUOTE"For how could the inertial motion of the baseball in our example be regarded as caused instrumentally by the thrower of the baseball, especially if the ball’s motion continues long after the thrower is dead?23
So, it is difficult to see how inertial motion, when interpreted as involving real change, could have a physical cause. But as we implied above, even if its lacks a physical cause, there is nothing in the principle of inertia that rules out a metaphysical cause."
Did you not read that part?
>Thus, I conclude that Feser fails to argue that the two principles are compatible in a *satisfying* manner.
Rather you proved you don't understand the difference between a philosophical modeling vs a description from physics from Adam.
>The two principles can only be made compatible by multiplying entities and causal relations.
Rather as one is a metaphysical description and the other is a description from physics to even claim they could be in conflict is a category mistake.
I think you skimmed the Paper Yair.
Fail.
Positivism on crack alert!
>Not A Metaphysical Principle
ReplyDeleteSo Yair is committed to treating it as an argument from physics & not a metaphysical principle or modeling.
How is that any different from a YEC treating let us say the Second Law of Thermal dynamics as a metaphysical principle to argue against evolution?
It isn't. It's positivism on crack.
>Finally, I would argue that Feser’s position is self-defeating. I have already showed that he must commit to additional external causal entities.
Which is the point of the First Way isn't it? The initial actuality requires explanation. Can you have a caboose pulled by an infinite line of box cars without a locomotive at the front?
This is after all a philosophical argument not an argument from physics but Yair has Positivism on the brain.
>But the Newtonian physics is fully consistent without assuming these other entities.
We are not giving an explanation of mechanism or function. We are giving an explanation of being.
>Hence, the principle of motion cannot be a metaphysical principle, since it is possible to conceive of change without it –
It is possible to model change using other philosophies but you haven't given any philosophical argument. You mention the Parmenedian but you don't make an argument for it.
Like I said Positivism on crack.
>Finally, I would argue that Feser’s position is self-defeating. I have already showed that he must commit to additional external causal entities.
ReplyDeleteIronically Feser explicitly denies he needs any.
As James A. Weisheipl has shown, the idea that Aristotle and Aquinas held that no object can continue its local motion unless some mover is continuously conjoined to it is something of an urban legend.12 To be sure, this was the view of Averroes and of some Scholastics, but not of Aristotle himself or of St. Thomas. On the contrary, their view was that a body will of itself tend to move toward its natural place by virtue of its form. That which generates the object and thus imparts its form to it can be said thereby to impart motion to it, but neither this generator nor anything else need remain conjoined to the object as a mover after this generation occurs. Aquinas comments:
[Aristotle] says, therefore, that what has been said is manifested by the fact that natural bodies are not borne upward and downward as though moved by some external agent.
By this is to be understood that he rejects an external mover which would move these bodies per se after they obtained their specific form. For light things are indeed moved upward, and heavy bodies downward, by the generator inasmuch as it gives them the form upon which such motion follows... However, some have claimed that after bodies of this kind have
received their form, they need to be moved per se by something extrinsic. It is this claim that the Philosopher rejects here.13
To continue what Feser says:
ReplyDeleteQUOTE"Even Aquinas’s understanding of projectile motion is more complicated than modern readers often suppose:
An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent so long as it retains the power communicated to it by the principal agent; thus the arrow is moved by the archer as long as it retains the force wherewith it was shot by him. Thus in heavy and light things that which is generated is moved by the generator as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby… And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles.14
To be sure, even though that which initiated a projectile’s motion need not remain conjoined to it for the motion to continue, Aquinas still thought projectiles required other, conjoined movers given that a projectile’s motion is not motion toward its natural place but is rather imposed on it contrary to its natural tendency.
But as Thomas McLaughlin points out, the motions of projectiles require such conjoined movers in Aquinas’s view
because of the kinds of motions that they are and not because of a general conception of the nature of motion itself. In this respect, projectile… motions resemble accelerated motions in Newtonian physics, for accelerated motions require a force to act on a body throughout the time that it is accelerating.
15
And insofar as natural motions require no such conjoined mover, the Aristotelian-Thomistic view sounds to that extent quite Newtonian indeed: “Thus, the Law of Inertia in the sense of absence of forces is similar to Aristotle’s concept of natural gravitation, which is very remarkable.”16
I posted a link to Yair's "response" over at Feser's blog to see if the regulars who have forgotten more philosophy than I have learned want to have fun poking holes in it.
ReplyDeleteHere is my modest contribution.
Yair writes:
>It appears to me, however, that this amounts to saying that “natural motion” or “inertial motion” can be actualized without being actualized by “something else”!
Feser unfortunately does not explicitly explain how this notion of “natural motion” fits with Principle of Motion 2. He says only that “a body will of itself tend to move towards its natural place by virtue of its form” [emphasis added] –
>but the object’s form (it’s essence, or structure) isn’t “something else… that is already actual” [emphasis added], as Principle of Motion 2 requires
I reply: Actually being "an object in Inertial motion" is it's form which was imparted when it was actualized as a moving object.. Your assuming all forms must be physical material forms.
Gee Yair would it kill you to learn the difference between Philosophy of Nature vs Natural Science?
You are committing catagory mistakes big time.
I responded to critiques in Feser's blog, and one place is enough. But this is the only point you raise I sincerely want an answer to, as it seems to me a contradiction in the A-T view, so I'll reply here to it.
DeleteThe APOM2 states that "Any potency that is being actualized is being actualized by something else (…that is already actual)".
If the changes in location during inertial or natural motion are not "real change", then no potency is being actualized and hence the APOM2 does not apply and it makes no sense to say that the body moves in this way "by virtue of its form"; it isn't the form that actualizes this movement, it's the instigator of the movement.
If the change in location is seen as a real change, a potential location that is being actualized (which I consider the only viable option), then the form "an object in Inertial motion" is the object's form and is hence not "something else" that can actualize its changes. Indeed, if an object's form is "something else" that can actualize its changes, then any object can be it's own cause, in contrast to the Scholastic view that only God is.
Cheers,
Yair
@Yair
Delete>If the changes in location during inertial or natural motion are not "real change", then no potency is being actualized..
The object that has the form of an object in inertia motion "is generated is moved by the generator as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby…". An object that has the form of an object in inertial motion has the power of natural motion which is actualized when given this form.
>it makes no sense to say that the body moves in this way "by virtue of its form"; it isn't the form that actualizes this movement, it's the instigator of the movement.
The form has the power of inertial movement. It's the formal cause of the movement. Your confused question begging incoherent metaphysics & philosophy of nature obviously postulates there are efficient and material causes in nature only. Not formal or final causes.
As Feser shown from quoting Aquinas no form of Occasionalism is required to explain causality.
>then the form "an object in Inertial motion" is the object's form and is hence not "something else" that can actualize its changes.
It's power to change it's location while in the form of an object in motion is the "something else".
Metaphysics asks why does it have this power vs not? What causes it to be that way? Why are the physics in our reality Inertia instead of Aristotle's physics(as defined by the view you falsely attribute to Aquinas ie it always needs a conjoined mover)?
You all but admitted on the other thread you are treating this as a scientific empirical question and not one of philosophy of nature.
You are not making any philosophical arguments. You are question begging in proposing without argument the incompatibility of Feser's view with various competing philosophies which you assume not argue for.
Your whole response is like dismissing Natural Selection because Richard Dawkins can't measure the atomic weight of natural selection.
You are not making any philosophical arguments or critiques.
Thus your responses thus far are worthless.
I don't mean that to offend you but it is clear to me you are stuck in a scientistic mindset and not a philosophical one.
Your whole response to Feser is one long category mistake.
@Yair
Delete<< An object that has the form of an object in inertial motion has the power of natural motion which is actualized when given this form. >>
My question is how is such a power compatible with the principle of motion.
<< The form has the power of inertial movement. It's the formal cause of the movement. >>
Whether it's the *formal* cause is irrelevant. The principle of motion requires an *other* actuality to actualize the change - whether this actuality serves as a formal cause or material cause or whatever is not relevant.
<< there are [not] efficient and material causes in nature only. [there are] formal or final causes [too]. >>
Irrelevant.
<< no form of Occasionalism is required to explain causality. >>
Irrelevant.
<< It's power to change it's location while in the form of an object in motion is the "something else". >>
This implies a mover can move itself, which has dire implications for the First Way. Are you sure you want to go there?
How do you fit this interpretation with Feser's rejection of the impetus? Is this power "infinite"? If it is finite, why isn't it corruptible?
It also makes a mockery of the APOM, as "Whatever is in motion is moved by ANOTHER" becomes directly false. Are you saying this formulation is incorrect?
<< You all but admitted on the other thread you are treating this as a scientific empirical question and not one of philosophy of nature.>>
I explicitly denied it.
<< You are not making any philosophical arguments. >>
You mean like asserting something without actually arguing for it? Say - like saying "You are not making any philosophical arguments"?
<< You are question begging in proposing without argument the incompatibility of Feser's view with various competing philosophies which you assume not argue for. >>
I didn't even CLAIM Feser's view is incompatible with other "various competing philosophies". You're reading into my words arguments that aren't there.
Relax. Take a deep breath. You have other arguments on your mind.
<< I don't mean that to offend you but it is clear to me you are stuck in a scientistic mindset and not a philosophical one. >>
Although it is completely besides the point, I have to ask - are you a professional philosopher? Have you any formal training in philosophy? How do you know so much about what a "philosophical mindset" is?
For the record, I have an undergraduate degree and several further academic courses in philosophy. While I'm not a professor of philosophy, I think I'm quite informed about what a "philosophical mindset" is.
<< Your whole response to Feser is one long category mistake. >>
The fact that two things are in two different categories does NOT automatically imply that they are incommensurate. Specifically, both principles deal with the causal structure, and are hence comparable. Indeed, Feser himself argues that if inertia is seen as a state the two are compatible *because they agree on the causal structure*.
Cheers,
Yair
So many mistakes and equivocations Yair.
DeleteYou need to read up on Philosophy and the AT tradition.
>This implies a mover can move itself, which has dire implications for the First Way. Are you sure you want to go there?
Wow you really have not read up on the AT tradition and philosophy have you?
Aquinas, Aristotle and Feser have talked about "movers that can move themselves" & are not God within the AT system.
Animals are called "self-movers" for example by Aquinas in a sense.
Of course an object can't actualize it's own power to move itself locally. Something already actual does that.
>You mean like asserting something without actually arguing for it? Say - like saying "You are not making any philosophical arguments"?
Name one philosophical argument you made in your response? I can't recognize one.
Point out what you think is a philosophical argument against Feser's paper or the first way.
>How do you fit this interpretation with Feser's rejection of the impetus? Is this power "infinite"? If it is finite, why isn't it corruptible?
It's only potentially infinite not actually infinite. It is more like an accident series which can be potentially infinite vs actually infinite.
But why it exists here and now is the question of metaphysics.
>Whether it's the *formal* cause is irrelevant. The principle of motion requires an *other* actuality to actualize the change - whether this actuality serves as a formal cause or material cause or whatever is not relevant.
So your going to continue to pretend here there are only efficient and material causes in nature and not formal or final & treat it has an efficient cause?
That is not helpful.
>I didn't even CLAIM Feser's view is incompatible with other "various competing philosophies". You're reading into my words arguments that aren't there.
Well you can only answer this particular paper with philosophical arguments for a competing philosophy. You can't answer with Science or empiricism.
>For the record, I have an undergraduate degree and several further academic courses in philosophy.
Degree in what? Physics? I have an undergrad degree too and I have taken academic courses in philosophy.
So what?
>My question is how is such a power compatible with the principle of motion.
It's been explained & I have quoted Feser till I'm blue but you seem to be expecting something else then what is argued & I still maintain you are making catagory mistakes.
>The fact that two things are in two different categories does NOT automatically imply that they are incommensurate.
Rather you shouldn't say incoherent things like "What are the metaphysical implications of Inertia a law of physics".
Catagory mistakes.
More later.
>Although it is completely besides the point, I have to ask - are you a professional philosopher? Have you any formal training in philosophy? How do you know so much about what a "philosophical mindset" is?
DeleteNo I am an amateur like you except I seem to be more informed on AT then you & I don't conflate Science with Philosophy.
Yair wrote:
DeleteI responded to critiques in Feser's blog, and one place is enough.
I am such an idiot! What am I thinking? Why am I not poaching for Feser's blog?
Maybe you will have the opportunity to get your questions answered by either Feser or the A-team over there.
(Not that George or Edwardo aren't doing well)
I said this over at Feser. You are at least trying (even thought I finder your philosophy incoherent) to make a substantive reply (as Scott said).
So I think you might have something to contribute?
It is better than jumping back and forth. Also it is a philosophy blog so it is better suited to answering your philosophy questions.
If we want physics questions answered then we can come here.
Cheers.
"Having read the original paper, my position is that Feser failed to successfully argue that inertial change in *position* can be seen as a 'state'."
ReplyDeleteI suppose that's true a fortiori, since he doesn't argue for it at all -- that not being in any way the point of his paper, which was pretty obviously about the compatibility of the principle of motion with the principle of inertia. No part of his argument for that compatibility depends on showing that uniform motion is a "state" -- merely that, if it is (or can be) characterized as one, that doesn't render the two principles incompatible.
As I read the paper, he says that not only is this position reasonable but it's his favorite.
DeleteI argue that this position is untenable (as do philosophers Feser quotes). Which renders the "IF it is" part of his argument irrelevant, which was all that I was claiming in that sentence (well, the following sentence).
Yair
"As I read the paper, he says that not only is this position reasonable but it's his favorite."
DeleteThat isn't my reading (and wasn't even before Feser disavowed it). But at any rate it's a legitimate issue over which to argue, so you have the advantage of Oerter there.
Some Anon guy posted this at Feser's blog. It is fraking hysterical!:-)
ReplyDeleteQUOTE""He is reduced to invoking hypothetical “metaphysical” external causes such as God or necessary substances, whose causal effect is not a force."
Did this guy just say that a person offering a metaphysical argument is "reduced to" positing metaphysical solutions?
I'm convinced that guys like this write what they do, knowing that they're completely missing the point, purely so really stupid atheists who are faced with arguments can link to it mindlessly as a refutation, confident that they won't understand the actual arguments at all so they won't be shaken when someone like Feser takes them apart."END QUOTE
Funny!
Really people would it kill you all to learn the difference between Philosophy of Nature vs Science?
Atheists can be philosophers. They really can.
Why do I bother sometimes......
So basically Feser says it is not the case that objects are moved along by angels. But he thinks that it is possible that angels could move objects along. Which of these propositions does Oerter disagree with? Does Oerter think that the claim 'angels exist' is not only factually incorrect but logically impossible too? If so, why does he think the claim is impossible?
ReplyDeleteFeser doesn't say that at all ya brain dead Gnu.
ReplyDeleteSheesh!
What did you get lost & wander in from PZ Myers blog?
Yair wrote:
ReplyDeleteI responded to critiques in Feser's blog, and one place is enough.
I am such an idiot! What am I thinking? Why am I not poaching for Feser's blog?
Maybe you will have the opportunity to get your questions answered by either Feser or the A-team over there.
(Not that George or Edwardo aren't doing well)
I said this over at Feser. You are at least trying (even thought I finder your philosophy incoherent) to make a substantive reply (as Scott said).
So I think you might have something to contribute?
It is better than jumping back and forth. Also it is a philosophy blog so it is better suited to answering your philosophy question.
If we want physics questions answered then we can come here.
I'm a little late to the party, if that is what this is. Blog land seems to thrive on caustic and excessive polemics. I have read Feser's referenced paper, and for what it's worth, he certainly seems to have opened himself to Oerter's line of criticism regarding the "necessity" for immaterial intelligent entities to conjoin material moving objects (Newtonian inertial objects) to account for continued motion, at least if other explanations failed. But on the other side, that aspect of his paper, subject to attack as it is, does not constitute a very important part of his paper.
ReplyDeleteThe problem I have is with philosophers who seem to feel they have to save Aristotle (or Aquinas), rather than merely elucidate their views. I simply cannot imagine Aristotle having any problems with Newton or the quantum physics that came later. By that I mean I suspect he would have incorporated every scientific advance into his metaphysics, revising any of his metaphysical notions, as needed, as he went. Somebody explain to me if I'm wrong about this: Aristotle conceived (if not derived) his metaphysical precepts his understanding of the natural world, not the other way around.
That having been said, I found Feser's paper very interesting. He does specify carefully the distinction between conducting science and philosophizing about the "why or how" behind science [p.9]. I appreciate learning that Aquinas had written about projectiles in a way that seems (to me) indicates the same thing I said above about Aristotle, that he was aware of the problem presented by the archer firing off an arrow - including the notion that the arrow might somehow contain it's own power to continue changing [p.7] - something today we might call momentum.
I do object to Feser's notion that the Aristotelian POM is somehow more fundamental than Newton's POI [p.10]. I understand him to mean, of course, that POM somehow explains or underlies POI, at a more general, universal or metaphysical level, while POI is somehow an example of an Aristotelian particular. If so, fine as a construct, but if he means to make a value statement about metaphysics versus natural science, then no. As Feser points out [p.9]:
"Now the principle of motion is ... another thesis whose import is metaphysical, a corollary of the distinction between act and potency which is the foundation of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature."
It is indeed the commitment to the carefully crafted notion of act and potency that seems to cause the problem here. But didn't Aristotle conceive (or derive) even this foundational 'principle' based upon his observations of actual nature. Am I wrong? Or am I right? If Aristotle did not conceive of this distinction by observing natural events, then from where did he obtain the notion? If he did conceive of it as a possible explanation of natural events, then how does such a 'principle' differ from any scientific hypothesis? If that analysis is correct, then this principle, too, is falsifiable, as any scientific hypothesis is, by a single verifiable material contradictory fact. Yes?
Peace out.
Editorial fix: last sentence of second paragraph of my previous comment, add the words "based upon" between "precepts" and "his" - words got dropped somehow, sorry.
ReplyDelete@c emerson,
ReplyDeleteYou're blurring the distinctions between metaphysics, philosophy of nature and physics, and that's a category mistake. Feser explains this better in this post:
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/05/natural-theology-natural-science-and.html
Of course, you may still disagree with him after reading it. But you'll understand the distinctions better.
"I simply cannot imagine Aristotle having any problems with Newton or the quantum physics that came later. By that I mean I suspect he would have incorporated every scientific advance into his metaphysics, revising any of his metaphysical notions, as needed, as he went. Somebody explain to me if I'm wrong about this: Aristotle conceived (if not derived) his metaphysical precepts his understanding of the natural world, not the other way around."
ReplyDeleteI think you're right about that (and for a more modern example of that approach, I'd name Errol Harris as exemplified in his The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science). The question Feser is addressing, though, is whether the principle of inertia does in fact require the rejection of the principle of motion.
The problem, basically, is that Aristotle's metaphysical commitment to the act/potency distinction is central to his entire outlook, to the point that any philosopher who rejected it couldn't be properly characterized as Aristotelian. Moreover, since (as Feser holds) there are important arguments for the existence of God that depend on the distinction, it's not one that should be cavalierly thrown away.
To my mind the really interesting question is about its status as a proposition of metaphysics. Aristotle does arrive at his metaphysical views by considering nature, but his approach seems to involve working out what our knowledge of nature presupposes: what must "being as such" be like in order for us to understand how the world works? The law of non-contradiction, for example, seems to be presupposed by all thought, not just by this or that understanding of nature/physics; is the principle of motion like that as well, presupposed by all physical theories, or is it presupposed only by some of them? That, I think, is the key question here.
Thanks, James, for the link. I shall read it soon. Thanks, Scott, for the reply. I am just in the middle of re-reading Feser's explication of Aquinas' First Way in Feser's Aquinas [p.65-81] so I can better connect these issues. Meanwhile perhaps I will take another look at Oerter's earlier post regarding Act and Potency in Physics. James, it's not my intent to be blurring the distinction between metaphysics and science. Rather I am trying to understand how to work with it. More specifically, how do the principles of POM and POI relate to each other? In fact, Feser's paper Part III is titled that way, "How the principles are in fact related" [p.10]. Meanwhile I am still looking for a clear difference between Aristotle's POM and a statement or assertion in theoretical physics, such as POI. In a certain sense, Scott, aren't all the laws of physics metaphysically presupposed by the events observed in conducting practical physics? Isn't that what Feser is in fact trying to work out in his paper with respect to POM vis a vis POI? From a set theory viewpoint I think Feser is asserting that POM incorporates POI when he says "they are describing nature at different but equally real levels" and that the POM "is necessarily more fundamental than" the POI [p.10]. If so, then it may be the POM that needs some clarification or rewording, not the POI. In addition I think there may be two levels of distinction here: 1) the general distinction between metaphysical statements relating to the physical world and formulations describing physical events, and 2) a second 'higher-level' distinction between those same metaphysical statements relating to the physical world and other types of metaphysical statements relating to, say, natural theology. Does that make any sense? If so, perhaps that's why abbreviated assertions relating to angels could raise more than eyebrows among skilled scientists? The important question remains: Is Aristotle's POM a statement, in whole or in part, about physics, or is it only about metaphysics? I'll be back again after reading a bit more. Thanks & Cheers.
ReplyDeleteI would warn you consulting Prof Oerter on metaphysics and philosophy makes about as much sense as consulting Feser on the particulars of Quantum Physics.
DeleteIn case you missed the link above in the original post that analyze Prof Oerter's philosophical mistakes.
http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/06/oerter-on-motion-and-first-mover.html
Reading it now, thanks.
DeleteScott, I am not trying to supplant your key question regarding the metaphysical status / importance of the principle of motion. To the contrary I think your's is exactly the right question to ask. And thanks for the reference to Errol Harris' book, which I shall look for immediately. The first person to comment on Oerter's Act and Potency in Physics post, Alan Aversa, referenced The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory by Pierre Duhem, which I have now read and found very enlightening. I look forward to reading The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science.
ReplyDelete"In a certain sense, Scott, aren't all the laws of physics metaphysically presupposed by the events observed in conducting practical physics? Isn't that what Feser is in fact trying to work out in his paper with respect to POM vis a vis POI?"
ReplyDeleteThey may in some sense be presupposed by those events, but I think Feser would say they're nevertheless not at the same level as the POM. That principle, I think, he would assign to the philosophy of nature (which he regards as prior to physics) rather than to physics proper. My own question is tantamount to asking whether he's right to do so or whether it's actually better regarded as a metaphysical principle (and I hasten to add that I don't know the answer myself). Either way would make it in some way prior to physics even though it would still have physical implications.
Hope you enjoy Harris. His approach in the book I mentioned is to look at modern science and see what sort of outlook it presupposes, and the result is on the whole pretty Hegelian.
Ben, Scott - Having now re-read the Feser post (Oerter on motion and first mover, I find the exchange between Vincent Torley and Ed Feser in the comments to be very much on point here. Comments are not numbered, but approximately they are Vincent at #21, Ed at #33 (his response to Vincent at 3:42 pm), and Vincent's reply at #51. I will look for Ed's YouTube lecture referred to by Vincent. The issue of course is whether the conclusion (that an external cause - pure act - is necessary to explain matter and form) actually follows (from any combination of premises presented by Aquinas in any of the arguments for God). In Feser's original post, he seems to allow for inertial motion of an object without requiring a coterminous physical force or efficient cause by allowing that an object may continue its motion because it is in its nature to do so - but that such nature, substance, must have been caused ultimately by an external cause (pure act). This leads to the issue of whether particles (as in particle physics) require or do not require an external cause to account for their substance or nature. A-T's say yes: something external to these particles is required to at least sustain their existence (based on the act / potency distinction). Most physicists say no: the fundamental material of the universe (particles and the energy they relate to) can be both timeless and therefore the ground or source of their own substance or nature. From an A-T perspective, why can't the physicist's view of reality actually be the case? Peace.
ReplyDelete>From an A-T perspective, why can't the physicist's view of reality actually be the case? Peace.
ReplyDeleteBecause of the reality of change. You can explain the immediate motion of a caboose by it being pulled by a boxcar in front of it but you can't explain it's ultimate motion in terms of it being pulled by an infinite series of boxcars. Either there is a locomotive in front of it figuratively speaking or outside of the series there is something causing the infinite un-powered boxcars to move or put them or keep them in a state of inertia.
You can have in AT an infinite series of accidental causes but not in an essential series.
Anyway the material you wish to read will likely answer most of your questions better than moi can.
Cheers.
BTW calling the above "the physicist's view of reality" is question begging a category mistake via blurring the line between physics, philosophy and metaphysics.
ReplyDeleteThe above is not "the physicist's view of reality" rather it is anywhere from the materialists or reductionists or some idealists and or a Parmenedian anti-realist ( all of whom might happen to be physicists) view of reality.
Ben, thanks for the reply.
ReplyDelete> You can explain the immediate motion of a caboose by it being pulled by a boxcar in front of it but you can't explain it's ultimate motion in terms of it being pulled by an infinite series of boxcars.
> You can have in AT an infinite series of accidental causes but not in an essential series.
On the points you make, I am reading Feser's Aquinas [p.70-71, discussing distinction between accidental and essential / efficient causes, and that while the former can be theoretically infinite, yet "By contrast, 'in efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to proceed to infinity per se ....' " , quoting Aquinas]. A few pages later, Feser analyzes Newton, as in this post by Oerter. Feser says [p.78, discussing various views of impulse or impetus], "In short, Newton's principle can hardly undermine the First Way if the existence of a first unmovable mover is needed in order to explain why the principle holds in the first place." I don't think Feser is subscribing to any particular view of impetus theory, but he seems to agree with the result that an unmovable mover is needed "to explain why the [Newtonian] principle holds in the first place."
My inquiry, of course, is why is an infinite series of essential / efficient causes "impossible." As Oerter might say: how does Aquinas know that? I think Oerter actually did say that in previous posts. I think, but am not sure, that Aquinas took that impossibility to be self-evident, like the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction. Can rational persons disagree on whether an infinite series of per se causes is impossible? Anyway, I will keep reading. Thanks again, Ben.
>My inquiry, of course, is why is an infinite series of essential / efficient causes "impossible."
ReplyDeleteWhy is it impossible for an infinite series of boxcars to pull a caboose?
Why is it impossible for 2+2 to equal 5?
>As Oerter might say: how does Aquinas know that?
Prof Oerter in the past has admitted to not being an expert in philosophy & in his better moments makes a good faith effort to learn but I would say like most scientists he has latent unexamined philosophical views.
Here I would guess he holds Hume's tendency to conflate imagination with comprehension. Sure I can imagine an infinite series of boxcars pulling a caboose just as I can imagine universe where whenever you take two objects in a set and add them to a set of two other objects a fifth object spontaneously generates out of the either.
But neither imagining is the same as conceiving. I can't conceive what is the initial or sustaining cause of the motion of the infinite cabooses or boxcars.
In the second case I am not really conceiving of a reality where 2+2=5 but of a reality with a property of 1+(2+2)=5.
>I think, but am not sure, that Aquinas took that impossibility to be self-evident, like the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction.
Based on realism he likely did.
>Can rational persons disagree on whether an infinite series of per se causes is impossible?
Well rational persons can believe all sorts of irrational things. If you deny realism you might disagree but then you inherit all the rational problems and contradictions associated with denying realism.
Thanks for the response. I must think on these things - I do think we are at an important point in the logic and in grasping how the mind grasps concepts. Thanks again.
ReplyDelete"When the world doesn't work the way you want it to, just invent some invisible, undetectable beings to fill the gap."""
ReplyDeleteYeah, like Multiverse..the Magical Everything Maker Machine
I also love ..I choose to believe their is no Freewill and you dont choose to believe it your dumb
Time is an illusion is a good one to spew out, right after you say the universe is 13 billions old and "started" at the big bang.
So I agree, it is better just to say we dont know instead of making fools ourselves.